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New Developments for Federally Subsidized Housing
Tenants in North Carolina
On July 12, 1985, the North Carolina General Assembly passed an Act
establishing criminal penalties for recipients who obtain housing assistance1
through fraudulent misrepresentation. 2 In addition, the Act provides that housing authorities may evict tenants from public housing 3 projects for failure to pay
rent "without regard to personal fault on the the part of the tenant."' 4 The new
Act amends the Housing Authorities Law, 5 which was enacted as an enabling
statute for local housing authorities (LHAs). 6 With the passage of these amendments, the North Carolina General Assembly has sent a strong message that it
intends to protect the ability of North Carolina's housing authorities to ensure
their financial stability by (1) providing them a specific and potent deterrent
against fraud, and (2) insulating them against the recent judicial creation of a
personal fault defense in housing authority tenant evictions for failure to pay
7
rent.
This Note examines the impetus behind the enactment of the amendments
to the Housing Authorities Law and the amendments' implications for housing
authority tenants across the state. It also explores certain ambiguities in the
amendments that could lead to confusion in their application and that could
result in a wider application of their provisions than intended. The Note concludes by suggesting an alternative defense for tenants threatened with eviction
for failure to pay rent that does not conflict with the new provisions of the Hous1. In this Note the term housing assistance refers to tenancy in the governmentally supplied
rental housing for lower-income citizens subsidized under the federal public housing program. See
infra note 3. The other major federally subsidized program for lower-income citizens, Section 8
Housing Assistance, is discussed infra at notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
2. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 741, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 983, 983 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 157-29.1 (Supp. 1985)). The act was entitled "An Act To Prohibit Obtaining Housing
Assistance By Misrepresentation And To Authorize Eviction of Tenants For Failure To Pay Rent."
Id.
3. Public housing refers to the federally subsidized housing program established by the National Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937). The 1937 Act was revised and readopted
by Congress in 1974 by Pub. L. No. 93-383, Title II, § 20(a), 88 Stat. 653 (1974) and is currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982). Over 1.2 million housing units have been supplied through the
public housing program. THE NATIONAL HoUsING LAW PROJEcT, HUD HOusING PROGRAMS:

TENANT'S RIGHTS, ch. 1.3.1, at 1-10 (1981). For a description of the public housing program, see
infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
4. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 741, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 983, 984 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 157-29 (Supp. 1985)).
5. Act of May 11, 1935, ch. 456, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 771, amended in partby Act of July 12,
1985, ch. 741, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 983 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 157-1 to -70 (1982 & Supp.
1985)).
6. LHAs are municipal corporations that administer the federal public housing program. See
infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text. In the "[flinding and declaration of necessity" section of
the Housing Authorities Law, the legislature found that "unsanitary or unsafe dwelling accomodations exist.., throughout the state... constituting a menace... [and] cannot be remedied by the
ordinary operation of private enterprise." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1982).
7. See infra notes 13, 66-97 and accompanying text.
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ing Authorities Law and that is in accordance with existing federal regulations8

governing public housing.
The act can be analyzed as two distinct parts. First, it adds a new subsection 9 to the Housing Authorities Law entitled "Fraudulent misrepresentation"

which establishes criminal misdemeanor and felony penalties for those who
fraudulently obtain housing assistance. 10 Second, it adds an additional subdivision to the main section of the Housing Authority Law that sets forth the circumstances under which a housing authority can terminate or refuse to renew a

lease.I 1 These additions track the basic language and intent of the applicable
federal regulations governing tenant eviction from public housing. 12 Its significance lies in its annulment of the "personal fault" defense to an eviction for

failure to pay rent created by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Maxton
HousingAuthority v. McLean.13
An understanding of the role of LHAs in federally subsidized housing is

necessary to understand the scope and applicability of the new Act. In 1937 the
landmark United States Housing Act 14 created the first national "low rent" pub-

lic housing program. 15 Under the program the federal government provides
subsidies to LHAs to build and develop rental housing units for lower income
tenants.1 6 LHAs are municipal corporations authorized under state enabling
legislation 17 that own the housing projects and are responsible for their management and administration.'

8

As set forth in the United States Housing Act, the public housing program
is administered on the federal level by the U.S. Department of Housing and
8. The relevant federal regulations governing public housing can be found at 24 C.F.R.
§§ 912.1-.4, 913.101-.109, 941.101-.505, 966.1-.54 (1985).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-29 (Supp. 1985).

10. Id. § 157-29.1.
11. Id. § 157-29.
12. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
13. 313 N.C. 277, 328 S.E.2d 290 (1985).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982). See supra note 3.
15. The purpose of the public housing program is "to provide decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings ... for families of low income." 42 U.S.C § 1437a(1) (1982). For a description of income
limits, see infra note 16. Public housing was originally described as a "low-rent" program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1969), and was directed towards the "lowest-income" groups. Id. § 1402(2). These requirements were modified by the Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, Title II,
§ 201(a), 88 Stat. 653 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982)).
16. A "lower-income" family is defined as one whose "[a]nnual [i]ncome does not exceed 80
percent of the median income for the area, as determined by (the Department of Housing and Urban
Development] with adjustments for smaller and larger families." 24 C.F.R. § 913.102 (1985). "Very
low-income" families, those whose income does not exceed 50% of the area median, are now given a
preference for public housing. Id.; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437n (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). Annual
income is the "anticipated total income from all sources received by the Family head and spouse ...
and by each additional member of the Family" minus various statutorily allowed deductions. 24
C.F.R. § 913.106 (1985).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 157-1 to -.70 (1982 & Supp. 1985); see supra note 6.
18. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 941.101(a) (1985) (outlining purpose of public housing and responsibilities of LHAs with reference to specific regulations affecting the operation and management
of public housing projects); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(c)(1), (2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985) (defining "development and operation" with respect to public housing).
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Urban Development (HUD).19 However, a significant amount of authority and

autonomy is vested in the LHAs. 20 The LHA is typically responsible for initiating the project and arranging for its siting and design. Furthermore, it has con-

trol over the project's daily operations, including staffing, maintenance and

repair, tenant selection and eviction, and any legal action against tenants.2 1 In

recent years, however, federal regulations and judicial decisions protecting tenants' rights have put constraints on LHA management autonomy, particularly
22
in the areas of tenant selection, eviction, and allowable rents.
Federal funding for the capital cost of the housing projects is provided to

the LHAs through an annual contributions contract (ACC)23 with HUD.
While limited operating subsidies are available from HUD, 2 4 LHAs are expected to meet their operating expenses with tenant rent receipts. The North

Carolina Housing Authorities Law does not provide for any additional state financial assistance to the LHAs although cities in their discretion may make
donations or loans to defray the LHAs' operating expenses. 25
In recent years many LHAs across the country have experienced serious

financial difficulties. 26 Although a variety of factors, including mismanagement
and deteriorating housing stock, have contributed to their plight, many LHAs

and some commentators have blamed the increasing tide of federal regulations
and judicial decisions regulating tenant rents, admission, and eviction procedures as an additional source of financial instability. 2 7 Because these reforms
often had financial implications and were not always accompanied by additional
funding, they did have an impact on the ability of LHAs to be financially sound
entities.

28

19. HUD was founded in 1965, Act of Sept. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79 Stat. 667 (1965)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3531-3539 (1982)), to administer federal programs designed to achieve the
Congressional goal of a "decent home and suitable living environment for every American family."
12 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
20. The declaration of policy in the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 as amended states that, "consistent with the objectives of this chapter, [the policy is] to vest in local public housing agencies the
maximum amount of responsibility for the programs." 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. 1985).

21. D.

PHARES, A DECENT HOME AND ENVIRONMENT: HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 9

(1977)

22. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (1982).
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715(2)(a) (1982). The operating subsidies available from HUD are limited
and the amount distributed to each LHA is determined through a complex formula referred to as the
Performance Funding System (PFS). See 24 C.F.R. § 990.109 (1985). The subsidy is limited and to
the extent an LHA has higher operating expenses than the standard or lower revenues due to vacancies or rent default, the LHA's deficit may not be covered by the available HUD subsidies. See id.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-43 (1982).
26. See R. KOLODNY, EXPLORING NEW STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING PUBLIC HOUSING
MANAGEMENT 65-68 (1979).
27. See, eg., OFFICE OF POLICY DEv. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. AND URBAN
DEV., PROBLEMS AFFECTING Low RENT PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS: A FIELD STUDY 95 (1979)

(survey of public housing managers elicited complaints that evicting problem tenants was difficult);
Fuerst & Petty, PublicHousing in the Courts: Pyrrhic Victoriesfor the Poor, 9 URB. LAw. 496, 512
(1977) (criticizing what the authors termed "heavy-handed" judicial interference in the administration of federally subsidized housing).
28. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 24, 24 (1983) (pointing out that federal regulation of LHA operations may add to LHA costs by "increasing the time spent in documenting
compliance and by limiting flexibility in decisionmaking").
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The impetus behind North Carolina's amendments to the Housing Authorities Law and their probable effectiveness is best assessed using this background.
The amendments were the result of intense lobbying efforts by many state
LHAs 29 and clearly were designed to assist them in their efforts to operate in a
fiscally responsible manner and preserve their administrative autonomy. The
amendments also were designed to help ensure that the limited resources of the
LHAs 3° will be directed towards those tenants most in need and those tenants
who are honest in reporting their income and prompt in paying their rent.
Given these objectives and the fact the amendments did not require any financial
support from the state, it is not surprising that the legislature was so amenable to
31
passage of the act.
The housing fraud provision of the act is essentially identical to the existing
fraudulent misrepresentation state law governing receipt of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) payments, 32 and to a lesser extent, the state laws
governing receipt of Food Stamps 33 and Medicaid.3 4 Under the provision any
"provider or recipient" 35 of housing assistance payments who "willingly and
knowingly and with intent to deceive makes a false statement or misrepresentation or who willfully and knowingly and with intent to deceive fails to disclose a
material fact" 36 and as the result of these actions obtains or attempts to obtain
housing assistance can be charged with a criminal offense. 37 An attempt to receive or the receipt of less than four hundred dollars worth of housing assistance
fraudulently is a misdemeanor, while the receipt of over four hundred dollars
38
worth of assistance fraudulently obtained is a Class I felony.
There is little case law in North Carolina concerning the existing welfare
fraud statutes for AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid payments although prose39
cution in the federal district courts under federal fraud provisions is common.
1

29. Interview with Don Saunders, Managing/Housing Attorney, North Carolina Legal Serv-

ices Resource Center, Inc. in Raleigh, North Carolina (Nov. 6, 1985). However, not all North
Carolina Housing Authorities supported the Act. See infra note 52.

30. The National League of Cities estimates that only one-fifth of all lower income renter
households are able to obtain any type of federal housing assistance. NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES,
FEDERAL HOUSING ASsIsTANcE:

WHO NEEDS IT7? WHo GEs

ITS? 19 (1985). This estimate

should be compared with figures indicating that approximately 62% of all very low-income families
live in inadequate housing or are subject to an excessive rent burden (rent payments exceeding 30%
of income). THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., REPORT 10-11 & table 1.4 (1981).
31. The Act passed by a vote of 45 to 0 in the State senate and 80 to 13 inthe State house. Vote
tallies supplied by Legislative Library in Raleigh, North Carolina (March 28, 1986).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-39 (Supp. 1985). The AFDC program is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-615 (1982).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-53 (Supp. 1985). The Food Stamps program is codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (1982).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-64 (Supp. 1985). The Medicaid program is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396, Title XIX (1982).
35. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 157-29.1 (Supp. 1985).

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Interview, supra note 29. The federal general fraud statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1982). Specific federal statutes establishing criminal penalties for fraud in transactions with HUD
are at id. §§ 1010, 1012.
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In State v. Bass4° a North Carolina Court of Appeals case concerning AFDC
and food stamp fraud, the court stated that "the agency making the payments
41
does not have to be deceived" by fraudulent misrepresentation to prosecute.
This language distinguishes the welfare fraud statutes from the broader state
criminal statute and associated case law governing the obtaining of property by
false pretenses. This crime requires that the defrauded party actually be
deceived by the misrepresentation or omission of material fact. 42 In addition,
the Bass court stated that "an employee of the agency.., or the provider of the
funds" can be charged with fraud under the welfare fraud statutes 43 and that
restitution of the value of the benefits received also may be required provided
that such restitution is related to the criminal act.44 Given the similarity of the
statutes, it is likely that the distinctions and statements made by the Bass court
will apply with equal force to the housing fraud statute.
Although it is clear that a recipient or provider of housing assistance may
be prosecuted under the statute, it is unclear whether the statute applies only to
the public housing program because the term "housing assistance" is not defined. LHAs by definition administer the public housing program, but many
LHAs across the state also administer the other major federal subsidized housing program commonly known as Section 8. 45 Section 846 is a program designed
to enable low and moderate income tenants to rent existing units from private
landlords by paying the landlord a subsidy that covers the gap between what the
tenant can afford and the actual rent of the unit.47 Under federal regulations, a
public housing authority (PHA) or HUD is responsible for administering the
housing assistance payments contract with a Section 8 landlord. 48 Despite the
similarity in names, a PHA for the Section 8 program is not necessarily the same
entity as a Public Housing LHA. LHAs are eligible, however, to act as Section 8
49
PHAs.

To the extent that an LHA established under the general enabling provision
of the state's Housing Authority Laws also acts as a Section 8 PHA, the ques40. 53 N.C. App. 40, 280 S.E.2d 7 (1981).
41. Id. at 44, 280 S.E.2d at 10.
42. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (1981). In State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 262 S.E.2d
277 (1980), the court discussed the requirements of a criminal fraud case, including the requirement
that the defrauded party actually be deceived by the defendant. Id. at 242, 262 S.E.2d at 284.
43. Bass, 53 N.C. App. at 44, 280 S.E.2d at 10.
44. Id. at 41-42, 280 S.E.2d at 9-10.
45. Approximately 34 Public Housing LHAs across the state also administer the Section 8
assistance program. Interview with Doris Evans, Secretary of Assisted Management Branch, HUD
Field Office in Greensboro, North Carolina (March 28, 1986). In North Carolina, there are approximately 42,436 housing units sudsidized under public housing and 38,946 housing units subsidized
under Section 8 and other rental assistance programs. Information Sheets dated March 1985 supplied by HUD Field Office, Greensboro, North Carolina.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982).
47. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.106 (1985) (contract rents for Section 8 assisted units); id. § 813.107
(tenant share of contract rent). The actual rent for section 8 units is subject to HUD fair market rent
limitations. Id. § 882.106.
48. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.116 (1985) (PHA responsibilities); id. § 882.121 (HUD administration).
49. 24 C.F.R § 882.102 (1985).
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tion arises whether recipients of Section 8 benefits, who include the landlords
who receive the rent subsidy as well as tenants, could be prosecuted under the
Housing Fraud Act. Although there are structural differences between the two
programs, there is no apparent reason why fraud under the two programs should
be treated differently. Thus, reason would dictate that recipients of Section 8
housing assistance payments would be subject to the housing fraud statute. On
the other hand, because the housing fraud law apparently only applies to LHAs
established under the Housing Authorities Law, the application of the housing
fraud statute to the recipients of Section 8 benefits would be inappropriate. This
problem arises because not all Section 8 PHAs are LHAs covered by the statute.
Although the problem could be resolved by judicial action, it would be preferable if the legislature clarified the scope of the law because courts are not always
able to unravel accurately the complexities of the different federal housing
programs.
An additional problem that may arise in the application of the housing
fraud law relates to the "willfully, and knowingly and with intent to deceive" 50
element of the offense. Obviously, this is a question for the trier of fact to determine and it is one that exists in all allegations of fraud, but the nature of the
housing programs may make fraud in the housing context more difficult to ascertain than in other contexts. For tenants, the opportunity for fraud lies primarily in the reporting of family income. Family income is statutorily defined,
and it determines eligibilty for public housing tenancy as well as the rent that the
family will pay for their unit.5 1 The regulations relating to the proper determination of family income are complex and difficult for even the LHAs to unravel. 52 Because a mistake may be construed as fraud in the context of family
income reports, it is crucial that LHAs provide the best possible instructions to
tenants for completing the reports. Otherwise, innocent tenants could be burdened with criminal charges. LHAs also should develop clear and reasonable
guidelines governing the definition of "family" because the presence of "overnight guests" often leads to disputes over whether the guest is in fact a family
53
member and therefore a tenant whose income must be reported to the LHA.
Once a person is convicted under the new housing fraud act, sentencing will
depend on whether the conviction is for the misdemeanor or felony offense. The
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-29.1 (Supp. 1985).

51. See supra note 16.

52. James H. Colson, Chairman of the the Raleigh Housing Authority, stated in a letter to
Richard Wright, the Chairman of the House Judiciary II Committee of the North Carolina State
House of Representatives, regarding the then proposed housing fraud legislation that:

[t]he computation of eligibility for housing assistance and the amount of assistance an applicant is eligible for has been complicated by the numerous law changes by Congress and
regulatory changes by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
There have been changes to the point that HUD officials themselves have been unsure of
how to do the computations.... [W]e feel that this Bill would have the effect of discouraging honest applicants from applying while having little or no impact upon the dishonest

applicant.
Letter from James H. Colson to Richard Wright (May 30, 1985).
53. See, eg., NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, supra note 3, chs. 14.2.2.4, 14.2.2.5 (1981)
(ch. 14.2.2.4 discusses LHA enforcement of moral standards and ch. 14.2.2.5 discusses changes in

family size).
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more severe offense is a Class I felony, 54 which is punishable under the North
Carolina criminal code by "imprisonment of up to five years or a fine or both." 55
Prior to the enactment of the Housing Fraud Act, an offender could have been
charged with the state crime of obtaining property through false pretenses, a
Class H felony, which has a maximum prison term of ten years. 56 The new law
thus reduces the maximum possible prison term by five years.
As currently drafted, however, a misdemeanor conviction under the new
law could result in a prison term of up to ten years, twice that permitted for the
felony conviction. This bizarre result is possible because the housing fraud law
does not specify the permissible punishment for the misdemeanor offense.
Under the state criminal code, misdemeanors for which no specific statutory
punishment is prescribed "shall be punishable by a fine [or] by imprisonment" of
up to two years, or both. 57 Misdemeanor offenses that are "done in secrecy and
malice, or with deceit or intent to defraud," however, are treated as Class H
felonies with a maximum prison term of ten years. 5 8 Because "intent to
deceive" is a necessary element of the housing fraud crime, it is clear that a
literal reading of the misdemeanor punishment statute would allow a misdemeanor housing fraud conviction to be treated as a Class H felony despite the
fact that a felony conviction for the same crime can only be treated as a Class I
felony.
The second significant amendment contained in the Act is the introduction
of permissible cause standards outlining certain circumstances for which an
LHA can terminate or refuse to renew a rental agreement. Prior to the Act, no
specific standards were mandated by the Housing Authorities Law. 59 LHAs,
however, have not been entirely free to set their own policies regarding these
matters since 1975 when the federal government instituted a set of "Lease and
Grievance" regulations for LHAs and their tenants. 60 The institution of the
lease and grievance regulations was prompted by a series of judicial decisions
concerning the procedural rights of tenants in federally subsidized housing 6 ' and
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-29.1 (Supp. 1985).
55. Id. § 14-1.1(a)(9) (1982).
56. Id. § 14-100. Obtaining property by false pretenses is a Class H felony, id., and is therefore
"punishable by imprisonment up to 10 years, or a fine, or both." Id. § 14-1.1(a)(8).
57. Id. § 14-3(a).
58. Id. § 14-3(b).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 157-1 to -70 (1982). The "Rental and tenant selection" provision of
the Housing Authorities Law did not mention eviction prior to the enactment of the act. Id.

§ 157.29.
60. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,402 (1975) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.1-.59 (1985)).
61. Initially, tenants in public housing had no rights beyond those afforded tenants at common
law. The chain of decisions expanding their rights began in 1967 when a Public Housing tenant in
Durham, North Carolina claimed that the LHA had violated the due process clause by terminating
her lease without explanation. The case, Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967), was appealed through the North Carolina courts to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
declined to rule on the merits of the case, citing instead a recently released HUD circular requiring
that LHAs explain decisions to evict. Id. at 673-74. A concurring opinion written by Justice Douglas strongly suggested that due process requirements apply to public housing and extend beyond the
basic notice procedures provided for in the federal regulations. Id. at 678-79 (Douglas, J., concurring). He suggested further that due process protects tenants from arbitrary eviction. Id.
Federal courts have expanded Justice Douglas' suggestions on due process. In Escalera v. New
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the resultant regulations govern, among other matters, tenant eviction and lease
renewal.
The eviction standards set forth in the amendment are not substantially

different from those in the existing federal lease and grievance regulations. Like
the federal regulations, the Housing Authorities Law now states that an LHA
shall not terminate or refuse to renew a rental agreement other than

for a serious or repeated violation of a material term of the lease such
as (i) failure to make payments due under the rental agreement... (ii)

failure to fulfill the tenant obligations set forth
in [the relevant federal
62
regulation]... or, (iii) other good cause.

The amendment departs from the federal regulations with the added condition
that "[e]xcept in the case of failure to make payments due under a rental agree-

ment, fault on the part of a tenant may be considered in determining whether
good cause exists to terminate a rental agreement."'63 Although this condition

appears to expand the concept of good cause, 64 its importance lies in its exclusion of all consideration of fault on the part of the tenant from any eviction
proceeding stemming from nonpayment of rent. Thus, the amendment effectively overruled the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Maxton only a
York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 860-66 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that procedural due process applied to
federally subsidized low-income housing and required eviction procedures more extensive than those
set forth in the HUD circular. In another North Carolina case, Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth.,
433 F.2d. 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit outlined the essential elements of due process in this context. These elements
include the right to notice, the opportunity to confront and examine adverse witnesses, the right to
be represented by counsel, and the right to a hearing before an impartial decision maker. Id. at 1004.
HUD responded to this series of decisions by promulgating the lease and grievance regulations
in 1975. 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.1 to -.59 (1985). These regulations applied only to LHA owned projects,
id. § 966.51, and governed, among other matters, procedural requirements and allowable reasons for
tenant evictions. Id. §§ 966.1 to -.59. Under the new regulations, the scope of protection afforded to
low-income tenants in other federally subsidized programs was still unclear. Extension of the due
process eviction procedures to programs involving private landlords, such as Section 8, was considered impractical by some commentators. See, e.g., Williams, The Future of Tenant's Rights in Assisted Housing Under a Reagan Voucher Plan: An Analysis of Section 8 Existing Housing Cases, 23
URBAN L, ANN. 3 (1982). The good cause requirement for eviction in these programs was first
suggested in Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973), in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized that the interests of tenants in these programs also should
be extended basic due process protection. Id. at 1241-42. This requirement was later incorporated
into Section 8 regulations. See 24 C.F.R. § 880.607 (1985).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-29 (Supp. 1985). The language quoted here is virtually identical to
the federal regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 966.41)(1) (1985) (24 C.F.R. § 866.4(f) was redesignated at 24
C.F.R. § 966.4(f) in 1985). See infra note 99.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157.29 (Supp. 1985).
64. Good cause is a standard for eviction in 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(1)(1) (1985). From a strict
reading of the language of the regulations, good cause as it is used in the regulations ("or for other
good cause," id.) is a separate and distinct category of evictions for reasons other than nonpayment
of rent or failure to fulfill tenant obligations set forth in the lease. Therefore, nonpayment of rent or
failure to fulfill the tenant obligations set forth in the lease are presumably considered inherently
good causes for a LHA to terminate a lease. Several courts, however, have utilized the good cause
requirement to determine whether an eviction for undesirability-a violation of lease terms-was
valid. See infra notes 89-92, 100-02 and accompanying text. The Maxton court appears to have
been the first state or federal appellate court to apply the good cause standard to eviction for nonpayment of rent with reference to the personal fault of the tenant.
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few months after its pronouncement. 65
In Maxton, plaintiff, Maxton Housing Authority (Authority), sought to
66
evict defendant who was a tenant in an apartment owned by the Authority.

Defendant was an unmarried women with three children whose only source of
income was her AFDC check. Accordingly, defendant was not required to pay

rent to the Authority and received a monthly utility allowance check of six dol-

lars from the Authority. 67 In October of 1981 defendant married, and on the

basis of her husband's income, the rent on her apartment increased to 171 dollars a month effective December 1981.68 Defendant paid the new rent for De-

cember but not for January. In February the rent was lowered to 73 dollars a
month because defendant's husband had been laid off. 69 Rent for February and

March also was not paid and in late March the defendant and her husband

separated. 70 Defendant's AFDC payments were not restored until late in June
of 1982.71 The water and sewer had been disconnected in late May for an unpaid bill of fourteen dollars and were not restored until June of 1982.72
The Authority instituted summary ejectment proceedings against defendant
for failure to pay rent on March 11, 1982 and for nonpayment of utilities on July
20, 1982. 7 3 Judgment was entered for the Authority in both ejection proceedings74 and they were appealed and consolidated for trial. The district court af65. The Act was enacted on July 12, 1985 approximately four months after the March 14, 1985
decision in Maxton. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 741, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 983.
66. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 279, 328 S.E.2d at 292. Plaintiff in Maxton lived in a Section 8-New
Construction unit owned by the Authority and not in the Public Housing Units also owned by the
Authority. Record at 15, [Defendant's Exhibit No.1, Dwelling Lease] Maxton. Section 8-New Construction has a tenant subsidy mechanism similar to the larger Section 8-Existing Housing program,
see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text, but formerly provided additional federal funding for
the construction of the units. Congress is no longer funding the construction of units under the
program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (Supp. 1985).
The Maxton court did not seem to be aware of this distinction and treated the case as one
involving Public Housing without making reference to any of the regulations specifically governing
Section 8-New Construction. The court's confusion probably stemmed from the fact it is rare for
LHAs to own Section 8-New Construction units. For the remainder of this Note, reference will be
made both to the Public Housing regulations cited by the Maxton court and the equivalent regulations for Section 8-New Construction.
67. The federal lower-income housing subsidies generally include a reasonable utility allowance. If the tenant pays his or her own utilities this allowance can offset the tenant's rent payment,
and if it is greater than the rent payment, the difference can be refunded directly to the tenant. See
24 C.F.R. § 813.108 (1985) (Section 8 programs); Id. § 913.108 (1985) (Public Housing).
68. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 278, 328 S.E.2d at 291. The defendant's rent was raised pursuant to
24 C.F.R. § 880.603(c)(2) (1985) which allows for interim rent adjustments on the basis of changes
in family income. See also id. § 913.110(e) (1985) (Public Housing).
69. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 278, 328 S.E.2d at 291.
70. Id. There was evidence that when plaintiff attempted to speak with her husband about the
unpaid bills, he assaulted her. After they separated, he also refused to pay court ordered child
support. Id. at 282, 328 S.E.2d at 294.
71. Id. at 278, 328 S.E.2d at 291.
72. Id. at 278, 328 S.E.2d at 291-92.
73. Id. at 278, 328 S.E.2d at 292.
74. Maxton Hous. Auth. v. McLean, No. 82 CVM 1368 (Robeson Co. Magis. Ct., April 6,
1982); Maxton Hous. Auth. v. McLean, No. 83 CVM 3499 (Robeson Co. Magis. Ct., August 17,
1982).
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firmed the eviction. 75 The court of appeals also affinmed, noting that defendant's

lease provided that nonpayment of rent or utilities was a material noncompliance with the lease and grounds for lease termination. 76 A dissent by Judge
Becton argued that the "doctrine of necessaries" precluded defendant's eviction
because her husband should be responsible for the delinquent payments 77 and

that defendant's eviction was contrary to the North Carolina legislative policy
regarding public housing.7 8 Judge Becton further noted that eviction of a tenant

not at fault for nonpayment of rent was a violation of the "good cause standard"
incorporated in the federal regulations governing eviction in public housing and
that there must be a causal connection between the imposition of the eviction
sanction and a public housing tenant's own misconduct. 79
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and ruled

that defendant could not be evicted under the facts of the case.80 Specifically,
the Maxton court held that "in order to evict a tenant occupying public housing

for failure to pay rent as called for in the lease, there must be a finding of fault
on the part of the tenant in failing to make a rental payment."8 1 The court

emphasized that its holding applied only to leases between public housing authorities and their tenants. 82 Justice Meyer, joined by Justice Branch, dissented

from the majority opinion, stating that8 the
record showed good cause for the
3
Authority's termination of the tenancy.

The majority opinion incorporated the rationale of the second line of reasoning of Judge Becton's dissent. The court stated that the federal and state

policy of providing low-income citizens with affordable, decent housing was dis75. Maxton Hous. Auth. v. McLean, Nos. 83-CVD-632, 83-CVD-1482 (N.C. Dist. Ct., Robeson Co., June 20, 1983).
76. Maxton Hous. Auth. v. McLean, 70 N.C. App. 550, 551,320 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1984), rev'd,
313 N.C. 277, 328 S.E.2d 290 (1985).
77. Id, at 554, 320 S.E.2d at 325 (Becton, J., dissenting). The "doctrine of necessaries" is a
principle of family law that a husband is liable to his wife's creditors for necessaries furnished to his
wife. 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §§ 130, 132-33 (4th ed. 1980). The doctrine is

rarely used today because virtually all states provide for civil and criminal actions for support and
because courts commonly find that creditors have relied solely on the wife's separate credit. See
Cole v. Adams, 56 N.C. App. 714, 289 S.E.2d 918 (1982) (husband not liable to creditors for necessaries provided on credit to his wife); cf Presbyterian Hosp. v. McCartha, 66 N.C. App. 177, 310
S.E.2d 409 (1984) (wife not liable for debt of husband when hospital creditor intended to rely on the
separate estate of husband), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 485, 322 S.E.2d 761 (1985).
Necessaries are defined as those things essential to the wife's "health and comfort according to
the rank and fortune of her husband." Cole, 56 N.C. App. at 715, 289 S.E.2d at 919-20 (quoting 2
R. LEE, supra, § 132, at 128). Because the rent increase was predicated solely on the income of the
defendant's husband and the back rent was owed for a necessary-housing-it is certainly possible
that the doctrine could apply to Maxton. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, declined to
address this possibility. Maxton, 312 N.C. at 279, 328 S.E.2d at 292. Even if the doctrine was held
to apply to Maxton, it is not clear whether the liability of defendant's husband for the back rent
would necessarily preclude defendant's eviction.
78. Maxton, 70 N.C. App. at 554-55, 320 S.E.2d at 325.
79. Id.
80. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 282-83, 328 S.E.2d at 293-94.
81. Id. at 280, 328 S.E.2d at 292.
82. Id. at 283, 328 S.E.2d at 294.
83. Id. at 284, 328 S.E.2d at 295 (Meyer, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 9497 for the rationale of the dissent.
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positive of the appeal. 84 The court did not examine this point in great detail, but
its policy analysis appears to have been based more on the broad statements of
social purpose incorporated into the state and federal housing legislative acts

than on the actual structure of the public housing program.8 5 As a result of this
analysis, the court found that eviction of a blameless tenant would thwart the
social objectives of public housing. 86 The court dismissed the relevancy of defendant's lease provisions providing for termination of the lease for nonpayment

of rent or utilities. According to the court's analysis, federal regulations governing LHA leases did not provide for an automatic termination or right of
reentry upon breach of conditions in the lease.8 7 The court then looked to the
good cause condition for terminating public housing tenancies and determined

that the Authority did not have good cause to evict.88
The court found support for its conclusion that there was no good cause in
Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority8 9 and in Hines v. New York City
Housing Authority.90 Both cases involved a PHA's attempt to evict tenants for
"non-desirability"' based on the criminal acts of the tenants' nonresident relatives. In Tyson the court stated that "[tihere must be some causal nexus between
92
the imposition of the sanction of eviction and the plaintiffs' own conduct."
Applying this causal nexus test, the Maxton court determined that the "fault
resulting in the failure to pay the rent and water fee [rested] upon" defendant's
husband rather than defendant herself and that to evict on such evidence would
'93
indeed "shock one's sense of fairness."

Justice Meyer's dissent in the Maxton decision criticized the majority opinion, stating that the grafting of a "fault" standard on the good cause require-

ment for eviction was "unnecessary and unwise."'94 The dissent also emphasized

84. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 279-80, 328 S.E.2d at 292.
85. Id. Although the court referred to both federal and state public policy underlying public
housing, specific reference was made only to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1982), which sets forth the
public policy underlying the Housing Authorities Law. For an example of the broad federal policy
behind Public Housing and other federally subsidized low-income programs see supra notes 19-20.
The court reasoned that because public housing is occupied by the poorest of the state's citizens,
eviction of tenants for failure to pay rent would thwart the federal and state policy of providing
housing to them under certain circumstances. The court did not inquire closely into the subsidy
mechanism and funding for the Public Housing program, or examine any federal regulations governing the program except for 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(1) (1984). Maxton, 313 N.C. at 281, 328 S.E.2d
at 293. See infra note 99 and accompanying text for a description of this regulation and its Section
8-New Construction equivalent.
86. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 283, 328 S.E.2d at 294.
87. Id. at 281, 328 S.E.2d at 293. The court was partially correct in that the regulations do not
mandate eviction for nonpayment of rent. They do, however, allow eviction for nonpayment of rent.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text. In addition, the defendant's lease stated that grounds for
termination of the lease included material noncompliance with its terms such as "nonpayment of
rent beyond any grace period required by state law." Record at 16.
88. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 282, 328 S.E.2d at 293.
89. 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
90. 67 A.D.2d 1000, 413 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1979).
91. Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 516; Hines, 67 A.D.2d at 1000, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 734. For an example of an undesirability clause, see Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 520.
92. Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 519.
93. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 283, 328 S.E.2d at 294.
94. Id. at 284-85, 328 S.E.2d at 294-95 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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that defendant's nonpayment of rent or utilities was a material noncompliance
with the lease and grounds for eviction.9 5 Furthermore, Justice Meyer pointed
out that nonpayment of rent or utilities for whatever reason could result in unsanitary conditions in public housing complexes 96 and could lead to financial
instability for LHAs. He also stated that the majority holding would be fundamentally unfair in that the limitations on the ability of an LHA to evict would
cause hardship for those people on waiting lists for public housing who would
97
comply with the lease provisions.
The majority opinion in Maxton was a unique extension of the good cause
requirement for eviction and was undoubtedly a compassionate response to the
unfortunate plight of the defendant. The court was correct in considering
whether the Authority had good cause to evict under the applicable federal regulations and case law. Yet its conclusion that plaintiff's nonpayment of rent was
not good cause is questionable for several reasons. First, as the dissent emphasized, nonpayment of rent and utilities was a material noncompliance with the
lease in question. 98 Although obliquely worded, federal regulations governing
eviction in public housing clearly contemplate that nonpayment of rent is good
cause for an LHA to terminate a lease.99
Second, there is no indication in the regulations governing public housing
that there must be an element of personal fault before an LHA can evict a tenant
for a serious violation of the lease. The only cases arguably supporting such a
conclusion, Tyson and Hines,100 are easily distinguished from Maxton. Both
cases were concerned with eviction for a subjective cause-nondesirabilityrather than eviction for the more objective act of nonpayment of rent. In Tyson
the causal nexus test was closely linked to the first amendment right of association,10 1 and in Hines the court was concerned only with the residency of the
criminal relatives. 10 2 Thus, both courts ultimately decided tenants could not be
95. Id. at 284, 328 S.E.2d at 294-95 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 286, 328 S.E.2d at 296 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 284, 329 S.E.2d at 294-95 (Meyer, J., dissenting)
99. Specifically, the lease and grievance regulations for Public Housing state:
(1) Termination ofthe lease. The lease shall set forth the procedures to be followed by the
PHA and by the tenant in terminating the lease which shall provide:
(1) That the PHA shall not terminate or refuse to renew the lease other than for
serious or repeated violation of material terms of the lease such asfailureto make payments

due under the lease or to fulfill the tenant obligations set forth in § 966.4(f) or for other
good cause.
24 C.F.RL § 966.4(l)(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
Similar provisions are found in the regulations governing Section 8-New Construction, which
state that a lease cannot be terminated except for:
(i) Material noncompliance with the lease ....
(ii) Material failure to carry out obligations under any State landlord and tenant act; or (iii) Other good cause. ...
nonpayment of rent .... beyond any grace period permitted under State law will constitute
a material noncompliance with the lease.
Id. § 881.607.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
101. Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 520.
102. Hines, 67 A.D.2d at 1000-01, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
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characterized as undesirable on the basis of their nonresident relatives' acts. The
causal nexus test was not satisfied because no grounds for eviction were present
on the basis of the tenants' or resident family members' conduct.
In contrast, defendant's eviction in Maxton was directly related to her own
conduct in not paying the rent. Therefore, a strong argument can be made that
her eviction did satisfy the causal nexus test because nonpayment of rent is a
valid ground for eviction. 10 3 The Maxton court's equation of personal fault with
the causal nexus test is a questionable extension of the test, and it is one that
other state courts have rejected. For example, in Spence v. Gormley 104 the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a housing authority could evict tenants for
the nondesirable acts of their resident husbands and sons despite the fact the
tenants were not personally responsible for their families' conduct.10 5 Admitting it a harsh result, the court justified its decision on the ground that a housing
10 6
authority must consider the welfare and safety of all of its tenants.
Similarly, housing authorities are expected to be financially sound entities
and must operate within federal and state fiscal constraints to meet their federally mandated goal of providing decent affordable housing for low-income citizens. Given the lack of any additional funding to replace uncollected rent, the
Maxton holding could have jeopardized the ability of North Carolina LHAs to
meet this goal. Additionally, as Justice Meyer pointed out in his dissent, the
nonpayment of utility bills can create unsafe conditions within a housing complex (for instance, if the tenant's water or electricity were to be cut off) that can
endanger other tenants.107
In view of the preceding analysis, the North Carolina General Assembly
was correct in annulling the personal fault defense for eviction for nonpayment
of rent. The amendment to the Housing Authorities Law does not mean that
personal fault can never be considered in the determination of good cause to
evict; it is only eviction for nonpayment of rent or other payments due under the
lease that is exempt from such a consideration. 0 8 Thus, the rationale and policy
considerations expressed in Maxton may still be relevant when an LHA evicts a
tenant for other reasons. 10 9
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104. 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982).
105. Spence, 387 Mass. at 272-73, 439 N.E.2d at 750; see also Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza
South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1974) (eviction of tenant for husband and son's criminal
misconduct was distinguished from Tyson in that the husband and sons were residents of the household); accord Housing Auth. v. Bahr, 25 Or. App. 117, 548 P.2d 514 (1976).
The Spence court did not entirely abandon the concept of personal fault; it left open the possibility of a defense against termination of the lease when special circumstances indicate that the tenant
"could not have foreseen the misconduct or was unable to prevent it by any available means, including outside help." Spence, 387 Mass. at 279, 349 N.E.2d at 753. In contrast, the Maxton court's
defense was vaguely defined and potentially a much broader defense. Although defendant's control
over her husband's actions was undoubtedly an issue in Maxton, the court did not suggest that she
had any affirmative duty to either arrange for payment of the rent or terminate his residency in her

apartment.
106. Spence, 387 Mass. at 270-72, 439 N.E.2d at 748-49.
107. Maxton, 313 N.C. at 284, 328 S.E.2d at 294-95 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-29 (Supp. 1985).
109. See id.
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Despite the inability of housing authority tenants to raise the personal fault

defense in nonpayment of rent evictions, there is another defense available that
does not conflict with state statutes or with federal regulations. The amendment

specifically states that the housing authority's ability to terminate or refuse to
renew a lease because of nonpayment of payments due under the rental agreement is limited to instances in which the payments "were properly and promptly

calculated according to applicable HUD regulations."'
1

10

HUD policy guide-

lines' I state that "the rent that the family is paying at any one time should be

realistic in terms of the family's immediate circumstances." 1 12 When the rent is
3
unrealistic, an interim rent reduction is available under HUD regulations.11 If
a housing authority tenant can show that his or her calculated rent was unreasonable given the circumstances1 14 and that the Housing Authority did not adjust the rent promptly, the Housing Authority could not evict the tenant under
the new amendment.

This result is equitable and provides a housing authority tenant with much
of the protection the Maxton court attempted to provide without the overly

broad restraints on eviction that could have been established by the personal
fault defense. The examination of family circumstances in any particular case is

likely to involve some consideration of personal fault,1 5 but consideration will
be limited to an examination of whether the circumstances warranted an interim
rent reduction and if the payments due under the lease were correctly and
promptly calculated. Although defendant's rent in Maxton was correctly adjusted on the basis of her husband's income and subsequent unemployment, the
court could have found that her circumstances were so extreme as to have war-

ranted an interim reduction in rent.' 16 Such a finding could still result in a net
loss of funds to the housing authority, but this loss presumably would be characterized as a reduction in allowable rent receipts rather than as uncollected rent
117
which adversely reflects on the management abilities of the LHA.

110. Id.
111. Many of HUD's policies and directives are disseminated through the issuance of handbooks
and other types of notices. Generally, these issuances are considered binding on nonfederal parties
such as LHAs, particularly in the context of eviction. See, eg., Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S.
268 (1969); Housing Auth. v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 927 (1973); Staten v. Housing Auth., 469 F. Supp. 1013 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
112. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK, No. 7465.1, Rev. 4-4 (1978).
113. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
114. See, eg., Baker v. Housing Auth. (Huntsville, Ala. Housing Hearing, July 16, 1979) (copy
on file in the N.C.L. REv. office). In this decision the hearing officer found that the LHA's interim
reduction in rent was not sufficiently prompt to deal realistically with "[the tenant's] serious situation of being laid off work due to a strike that was none of her doing," Id. In a letter dated Aug. 2,
1979, the Housing Authority notified Ms. Baker's attorneys of its intention to appeal the decision to
the Board of Commissioners. Id.
115. See Maxton, 313 N.C. at 278, 328 S.E.2d at 291.
116. The Maxton Housing Authority received an order from the district court ordering it to
recalculate the defendant's rent in May of 1982. Record at 15-16. The Authority never did this,
contending that recalculation was unnecessary because rent was not being charged during the eviction proceedings. Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 17, Maxton.
117. See, eg., Kurtz, PoorManagement, Maintenance by LocalAgencies Cited by HUD, Washington Post, Jan. 3, 1984, at Al, col. 3. According to the article, one major factor cited by HUD

1986]

PROPERTY LAW

1469

In sum, the legislature's enactment of the amendments to the Housing Authority Law will have a noticeable effect on the rights of housing authority tenants across the state. From the tenants' perspective, the new legislation is a
mixed blessing. They will be subject to specific criminal penalties for fraudulent
misrepresentation resulting in the receipt of housing assistance and they will lose
the personal fault defense for eviction established by Maxton. These criminal
penalties will be less than those possible under the general criminal code,
although it is likely that prosecution will be more frequent under the housing
fraud act. The loss of the personal fault defense will be offset, however, by the
amendment's requirement that housing authorities be unable to evict unless the
rent was properly and promptly calculated according to HUD regulations. In
addition, the amendment allows lack of fault on the part of the tenant to be
considered in eviction proceedings not involving nonpayment of rent. Thus, the
basic theory of Maxton may survive although its application will be limited.
North Carolina's housing authorities will clearly benefit from the new legislation. They have a new tool to ensure that the housing benefits they distribute
will not be misdirected as the result of fraudulent misrepresentation. It is quite
possible that the existence of the housing fraud statute will deter potential violators; when it does not, the statute will provide for a reasonable punishment, with
the exception of the potential ten year term for the misdemeanor offense. Because the circumstances under which the housing authorities may evict are more
carefully delineated, they are spared the specter of a host of delinquent tenants
raising the Maxton defense while deficits mount. In return for these benefits the
housing authorities should take extra care to ensure that housing authority tenants are carefully instructed on the application procedures and the information
required for their eligibility to receive housing assistance payments because of
the possibility of criminal prosecution if they make a mistake. In addition, the
housing authorities should make every effort to ensure that tenant rent is calculated promptly and is reasonable in light of the tenant's family circumstances so
that no tenant is needlessly forced into eviction proceedings for nonpayment of
rent.
Finally, the general assembly should take action to clarify ambiguities in
the legislation. In particular, the general assembly needs to delineate the scope
of the housing fraud law by defining "housing assistance" so it will be clear
whether Section 8 benefits are included in this definition. If so, the general assembly may need to transfer the housing fraud law to the general criminal statutes so that it can apply to Section 8 housing assistance administered by PHAs
as well as that administered by LHAs. The potential inequities in the permissible
punishment for misdemeanor and felony convictions should also be
corrected.11 8
In theory, the new amendments will promote the just and efficient distributhat contributed to the financial instability of LHAs was the failure to collect rent and to evict

problem tenants. Id.
118. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. This inequity should also be corrected for
the AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid state fraud provisions. See supra notes 32-34 and accompa-

nying text.
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tion of housing assistance and help ensure that North Carolina LHAs remain
financially stable so they can carry out their federal and state mandated goals of
providing decent and safe housing for lower-income citizens. The Maxton holding was not practical given the financial constraints facing the state's LHAs and
the existing federal regulations governing tenant eviction. Nevertheless, the basic message that tenants who cannot pay their rent due to circumstances beyond
their control should not be evicted can and should be heeded by the housing
authorities to the extent the HUD policy guidelines require that family circumstances be considered in setting tenant rent. Courts and housing authorities also
need to take special care to ensure that the housing fraud provisions are not used
indiscriminately against tenants who justifiably may be confused by the regulations governing admission and rent certification in public housing. If these precautions are taken, the broad social objectives of the public housing program as
well its regulatory and financial constraints can be advanced by the amendments
to the Housing Authorities Law.
VALERIE

G.

CAMPBELL

Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Wright-Creditors'
Rights to Entireties Property Awarded to Nondebtor
Spouse Upon Divorce
Married couples in North Carolina have long enjoyed the benefits of holding property as tenants by the entirety.' A form of joint ownership available
exclusively to the marital unit, the entireties estate provides a haven from creditors of either spouse individually, and it is a convenient device for avoiding probate.2 The vast majority of married property owners in North Carolina have
chosen this form of ownership, 3 even though prior to 1983 the wife had no right
to possession or profits arising from the estate.4 Some commentators have suggested that the common-law entireties estate is an anomaly that should be abolished because of the injustice it works on creditors. 5 Yet in North Carolina the
1. The tenancy by the entirety originated at common law as a result of the common-law fictional unity of husband and wife. Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 203, 124 S.E. 566, 567 (1924).
2. One of the incidents of a tenancy by the entirety is the indestructible right of survivorship.
On the death of one spouse, the estate passes to the survivor immediately and in whole. Id.; R.
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHrrMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5, at 213-14 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as R. CUNNINGHAM]; 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 623, at

695 (1982). The owner of an entireties estate is neither the husband nor the wife, but "that third
person recognized by the law, the husband and wife." Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N.C. 202, 205, 13
S.E. 790, 791 (1891). Therefore, in North Carolina, the estate cannot be defeated or encumbered
except by the joint act of husband and wife. Neither spouse can impair the right of the other, if
survivor, to the fee simple absolute. Duplin County v. Jones, 267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 603 (1966);
First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 161 S.E.2d 484 (1954); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E.
566 (1924); P. HETRICK, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 125-26 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as J. WEBSTER]; 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 112 (4th ed. 1979).
For analyses of the tax consequences of holding property by the entireties, see 4A R. POWELL,

supra § 623.1, at 706.1-.5; Starling, The Tenancy by the Entireties in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. REv.
111, 148-50 (1961); Comment, Real Property- Tenancy by the Entirety in North Carolina: An Idea
Whose Time has Gone?, 58 N.C.L. REv. 997, 1010-20 (1980).
3. An estimated 90% of homes owned by married couples in North Carolina are held by the
entireties. R. LEE, supra note 2, § 112, at 37.
4. At common law the husband had the exclusive right to the control, use, possession, rents,
income, and profits of entireties property, subject only to the "right of the [wife,] if survivor, to
receive the land itself unimpaired. 'He cannot alien or encumber it, if it be a freehold estate, so as to
prevent the wife, or her heirs, after his death, from enjoying it, discharged from his debts and engagements.'" Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 96, 53 S.E. 478, 478 (1906) (quoting 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 132-33 (5th ed. 1844)). The husband's common-law right is
described as the right to the full control and use of the land to the exclusion of the wife. West v.
Aberdeen & R.R. Co., 140 N.C. 620, 621, 53 S.E. 477, 477 (1906). The husband's common-law
right was abolished by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (1984), which provides:
(a) A husband and wife shall have an equal right to the control, use, possession,
rents, income and profits of real property held by them in tenancy by the entirety. Neither
spouse may bargain, sell, lease, mortgage, transfer, convey, or in any manner encumber the
property so held without the written joinder of the other spouse.

Id.
5. For example, in Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 119 S.E. 751 (1923), Chief Justice Clark
suggested that the entireties estate is a "contradiction to our present legal thought and constitutional
provisions" and that there should be "no superstitious sanction attached to its retention," because it
was "created by judicial legislation by judges, in a barbarous age, who were not lawyers." Id. at 364,
119 S.E. at 755 (Clark, C.J., concurring). Clark would have held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2
(1984), which was enacted in 1784 and abolished the joint tenancy, impliedly abolished the tenancy
by the entirety. Clark saw the estate as an "unjust and invalid exemption," in excess of the exemptions allowed by the North Carolina Constitution. Id. at 363, 119 S.E. at 755 (Clark, C.J., concur-
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estate has survived and flourished.

Recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals examined the common-law
incidents of the entireties estate to resolve questions unforeseen at common law.

In Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Wright 6 the court examined the entireties
estate in the context of an absolute divorce and equitable distribution proceeding, a situation unknown at common law. The court held that a creditor of a
husband individually has a leviable interest in entireties property after an absolute divorce, 7 even when the whole of the entireties estate is awarded to the wife

pursuant to an equitable distribution proceeding. 8 This Note analyzes Wright in
light of the characteristics of the entireties estate in North Carolina and compares the court's resolution of the issue to the result reached in other jurisdictions. It rejects the court's conclusion that, between a decree of absolute divorce
and an award of entireties property to the nondebtor spouse, the debtor spouse
possesses an interest in the property to which a lien held by his or her creditor
can attach.
In 1981 Billy Wright executed a deed of trust on the residence owned by
him and his wife as tenants by the entirety to secure a forty-eight thousand
dollar loan from Branch Banking and Trust. 9 His wife, Mary Wright, "neither
signed nor consented to the note or deed of trust." 10 On May 5, 1982, the
Wrights obtained an absolute divorce, and on May 6, 1982, the residence was

awarded to Mary Wright in an equitable distribution proceeding. 1 The equitable distribution decree specified that "'[t]he husband shall have and hold the
wife harmless for any additional deeds of trust allegedly made on the property
ring). But, as Clark pointed out, the general assembly has consistently refused to abolish the estate,
even though the North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that it do so. Id.; see also
Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 96, 53 S.E. 478, 478 (1906) ("This estate by the entirety is an
anomaly, and it is perhaps an oversight that the Legislature has not changed it into a co-tenancy, as
has been done in so many states."); Starling, supra note 2, at 111 ("IThe tenancy has proved a trap
for the unwary, a blessing for surviving spouses, a curse to heirs and creditors, and a source of
endless litigation."); Comment, supra note 2, at 998 ("North Carolina should abolish or alter this
outmoded estate.").
6. 74 N.C. App. 550, 328 S.E.2d 840, petitionfor disc. rev. allowed, 314 N.C. 662, 335 S.E.2d
321 (1985). The case was voluntarily dismissed. See infra note 17.
7. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 553, 328 S.E.2d at 842.
8. Id. The North Carolina equitable distribution statute is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5020 (1984 & Supp. 1985). Parties seeking a divorce have the option of asking the court to determine
their respective property rights in accordance with § 50-20. Separate property, defined as "all real
and personal property acquired by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a spouse by bequest,
devise, descent, or gift during the course of the marriage," id. § 50-20(b)(2), is not subject to distribution by the court. Id. § 50-20(c). Section 50-20(c) directs the court to divide all marital property,
defined as "all real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the
course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties, and presently owned,
except property determined to be separate property," id. § 50-20(b)(1), equally between the spouses.
However, if in the court's judgment an equal division is not equitable, the court is given broad power
to divide the marital property "equitably." Id. § 50-20(c). Property held in a tenancy by the entirety clearly falls within the definition of marital property subject to distribution by the court.
9. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 551, 328 S.E.2d at 841. North Carolina law in 1981 permitted
Billy Wright to execute a valid mortgage on entireties property, although the mortgage was subject
to automatic termination if Billy predeceased Mary. Such a mortgage would not have been valid if
executed after January 1, 1983, because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (1984) abolished the husband's
common-law exclusive right to the control and enjoyment of an entireties estate.
10. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 551, 328 S.E.2d at 841.
11. Id.
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by him without the consent and permission of the wife.' "12 Billy Wright deeded
the residence to Mary Wright and then defaulted on the loan payments. After

Branch Banking and Trust sought to foreclose on the residence, Mary Wright
instituted a declaratory judgment proceeding to establish her unencumbered
13
ownership of the property.
The superior court concluded that the bank had no interest in the entireties
property. 14 On appeal the North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the lien created by the deed of trust could not have encumbered the entireties
properties in any way as long as the parties remained married. 15 The court held,
however, that the lien attached to the husband's undivided one-half interest at

the time of the divorce on the theory that a divorce converts a tenancy by the
entirety into a tenancy in common, giving each spouse an undivided one-half
interest in the property. 16 The court concluded that "the estate of a tenancy in
common of necessity intervenes between an absolute divorce and an award of

title pursuant to equitable distribution," even if the divorce and the equitable
distribution occur in the same proceeding. 17
North Carolina is one of twenty jurisdictions in which the tenancy by the

entirety has survived.' 8 In North Carolina tenancy by the entirety retains many
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 552, 328 S.E.2d at 841-42.
16. Id. at 553, 328 S.E.2d at 842.
17. Id. At the time the Wright case was instituted, Billy Wright could not be located in the
United States. He had defaulted on his mortgage payments and absconded. However, Mary
Wright's attorney learned of Billy's plans for a fishing trip near Morehead City and, before the case
could reach the North Carolina Supreme Court, had Billy arrested there for contempt pursuant to a
civil order of arrest. Billy was jailed until he posted bond in the full amount of the mortgage.
Therefore, the suit was voluntarily dismissed. Telephone interview with David P. Voerman, attorney for defendant Mary Wright (April 9, 1986).
18. The tenancy by the entirety exists in only twenty jurisdictions: Arkansas, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wyoming. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, § 5.5, at 211 n.3. Several states never
recognized the tenancy by the entirety, finding it "repugnant to our institutions and to the American
sense of justice to the heirs and therefore not the common law." Id.; see also 4A R. POWELL, supra
note 2, § 621, at 684 (citing illustrative cases). Several western states that never recognized the estate
presumably found it inconsistent with their community property systems, which afforded equality to
women. Id. at 685 n.5; Comment, supra note 2, at 997 n.3. A few states have interpreted concurrent
ownership statutes that do not mention the entireties estate or create a presumption in favor of
tenancies in common as abolishing the entireties estate. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, § 5.5, at
211 n.3; 4A R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 621, at 684.1. Some states that no longer recognize the
entireties estate have reasoned that the Married Women's Acts, which removed the common-law
disabilities of married women and destroyed the fiction of spousal unity, eliminated the entireties
concept. See, e.g., Donegan v. Donegan, 103 Ala. 488, 490, 15 So. 823, 824 (1894); Poulson v.
Poulson, 145 Me. 15, 18-19, 70 A.2d 868, 870 (1950).
Several jurisdictions have taken the position that the Married Women's Acts merely changed
the incidents of the entireties estate so as to abolish the husband's exclusive right to the control and
enjoyment of the land. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 31 (1951). Only North
Carolina, Massachusetts, and Michigan allowed both the estate and the husband's right to its control
and enjoyment to survive the Married Women's Acts. Id. at 29-3 1. Thus, for many years, commentators recognized these three as the only states that recognized the entireties estate in its most perfect
common-law form. See, e-g., 4A R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 623, at 696; Phipps, supra, at 28-32;
Reppy, North Carolina'sTenancy by the Entirety Reform Legislationof 1982, 5 CAMPBEtL L. REV.
1 (1983); Comment, supra note 2, at 997. Michigan eliminated the husband's right to exclusive
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of its common-law incidents. For example, any conveyance of real property to a

husband and wife creates a tenancy by the entirety unless there is an express
intent to create some other estate. 19 Furthermore, the common-law rule that an
entireties estate cannot be created in personal property persists in North Caro-

lina, even though the original justification for the rule, that a woman's personal
property belonged to her husband after marriage, has no merit today. 20 The
marital unit is the owner of the entireties estate; each spouse is "deemed to be

seized of the whole, and not of a moiety or any undivided portion thereof."'2 '
Therefore, during the marriage neither spouse can sell or convey any part of the
22
estate without the consent of the other.
Perhaps the most important incident of the entireties estate is the right of

survivorship. On the death of either spouse, the survivor immediately becomes
the sole owner of the whole "by right of purchase under the original grant or
devise and by virtue of survivorship--and not otherwise-because he or she was

seized of the whole from the beginning, and the one who died had no estate
which was descendible or devisable."'23 Divorce, however, destroys the right of

survivorship. The spouses become tenants in common upon divorce pursuant to
the common-law theory that an absolute divorce destroys the essential unity of
control and enjoyment in 1975, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.210(1) (Callaghan 1984), and Massachusetts did the same in 1979, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1981). North Carolina
retained this common-law incident longer than any other state.
19. Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 207, 124 S.E. 566, 568 (1924).
20. See Moore v. Greenville Bank & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 100 S.E. 269 (1919) (explaining
the reasoning behind the rule). The majority rule today allows tenancies by the entirety in personal
property. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, § 5.5, at 215.
21. Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 203, 124 S.E. 566, 568 (1924). Davis has been called the
"Magna Charta on the estate by the entirety in North Carolina." R. LEE, supranote 2, § 112, at 36.
22. The husband's common-law exclusive right to the control, use, possession, income, rents,
and profits did not include the right to encumber or convey the fee. Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95,
96, 53 S.E. 478, 478 (1906). A conveyance by one spouse, however, may be deemed valid under the
principles of agency or ratification. Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass, 241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d 828
(1967).
The doctrine of after-acquired title by estoppel is an exception to the rule that neither spouse
alone can convey his or her interest in entirety property. See Hood v. Mercer, 150 N.C. 699, 700, 64
S.E. 897, 898 (1909) ("where the husband had conveyed land by deed with warranty without the
joinder of the wife, and survived her, his grantee acquired title, but this was by way of estoppel").
North Carolina is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions in holding that neither spouse
alone possesses an alienable interest in entireties property. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 623, at
700; see, eg., Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 119 Fla. 641, 648, 160 So.
745, 748 (1935); Sawada v. Endo, 57 Hawaii 608, 614, 561 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1977); Hallmark v.
Stillings, 648 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). A minority of states allow one spouse to sell a
one-half interest in the property for the joint lives of the husband and wife, as well as his or her right
of survivorship. The purchaser becomes a tenant in common with the other spouse, but has no right
to a partition and will lose all interest in the estate if the nontransfering spouse survives the transfering spouse. Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 139, 268 S.W. 609, 611 (1925); King v. Greene, 30 N.J.
395, 412-13, 153 A.2d 49, 59-60 (1959); Hiles v. Fischer, 144 N.Y. 306, 315-16, 39 N.E. 337, 339
(1895); see also infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of this rule on creditor's rights). Tennessee and Kentucky courts have held that the only alienable interest in an entireties estate is the contingent right of survivorship. Hoffman v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 284, 60 S.W.2d
607, 613-14 (1933); Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1974). In North
Carolina the right of survivorship cannot be conveyed because it is "merely an incident of the estate,
and does not constitute a remainder, either vested or contingent." Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 205,
124 S.E. 566, 569 (1924).
23. Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 204-05, 124 S.E. 566, 568 (1924).
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husband and wife. 24
The sole exception to the similarity between the North Carolina entireties
estate and the common-law entireties estate concerns the husband's commonlaw right to all control and enjoyment of the land. This right included the right
to possession, rents, profits, and income, to the exclusion of the wife. 25 At common law, the husband was entitled to use and control entireties property as if it
belonged to him alone, limited only by his inability to encumber the fee. He
could keep for himself any profits earned from the land. 26 He could execute a
valid lease, easement, mortgage, or deed of trust on the entireties property,
which would fail and be cancelled only if the wife survived him. 27 With the

passage of North Carolina General Statutes section 39-13.6 in 1981, the wife's
right to the control and enjoyment of the entireties estate was made equal with
that of the husband. 28 The situation in Wright could not arise today because

section 39-13.6 makes it impossible for either spouse alone to execute a valid

lease, mortgage, or other transfer of entireties property.29 Nevertheless, because

the statue applies only prospectively, Wright raises an important and recurring
issue.
During the marriage, only creditors of both spouses jointly can execute and
levy on entireties property in North Carolina.30 A creditor of one spouse individually cannot reach any interest in the estate. Prior to the passage of section
24. Divorce makes each spouse the owner of an undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common. Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 140, 195 S.E.2d 552, 559 (1973); Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C. 458,
462, 121 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1961); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 207-08, 124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924);
Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 362, 119 S.E. 751, 754 (1923). This is the majority rule. 4A R.
POWELL, supra note 2, § 624, at 708. It is questionable whether this rule is applicable when entireties property is awarded to one spouse. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
In Canada a divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a joint tenancy, on the theory that a
joint tenancy is the estate that would have been created had the transferees not been married at the
time of the conveyance to them. Glenn, Tenancy by the Entireties: A MatrimonialRegime Ignored,
58 CANADIAN B. REv. 711, 720-21 (1980).
25. Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 96, 53 S.E. 478, 478 (1906).
26. The wife was not even entitled to an accounting of the income produced by the entireties
property. North Carolina Bd. of Architecture v. Lee, 264 N.C. 602, 610, 142 S.E.2d 643, 649 (1965).
27. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 161 S.E.2d 484 (1931) (husband may
execute a valid mortgage, which will be cancelled if wife survives him); Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C.
682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924) (husband may lease the property); Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C. 520, 99
S.E. 407 (1919) (husband may grant a right-of-way across the property to a railroad). In each case
the encumbrance was automatically defeated if the husband predeceased the wife.
The husband was without power to execute a lease, mortgage, or other encumbrance that would
impair the fee. For example, a husband alone could not relinquish the right to a negative easement.
Moore v. Shore, 208 N.C. 446, 448, 181 S.E. 275, 277 (1935) (wife did not sign petition to remove a
covenant specifying that lots in the subdivision were restricted to use for residential purposes; therefore, the covenant survived and defendant was prohibited from erecting a filling station in the neighborhood). Furthermore, although a husband could convey the right to possession for the husband's
lifetime by way of grant to a third party, the grantee was not entitled to cut timber on the property,
because the timber is a part of the fee. Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N.C. 95, 53 S.E. 478 (1906).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (1984).
29. Id.
30. L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968); Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C.
447, 31 S.E.2d 362 (1944); Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924); Davis v. Bass, 188
N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924); Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 119 S.E. 751 (1923). The general
rule in other states is that a creditor of one spouse can reach whatever interest the spouse is free to
convey, which, according to the majority rule, is nothing. See supranote 22 and accompanying text.
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39-13.6, however, creditors of the husband individually could reach the rents
andprofits of the estate after they were earned and severed from the fee. 3 1 Because section 39-13.6 does not address creditors' rights in the estate, the logical
inference is that the rule shielding entireties property from the creditor of one
32
spouse individually is left intact.
33
The issue presented to the Wright court was one of first impression.
Never before had the North Carolina courts been called on to decide whether
the common-law rule that an absolute divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety
into a tenancy in common applies when entireties property is awarded to one
spouse. The Wright court based its decision solely on the black letter of the
common-law rule and the fact equitable distribution "follow[s]" ' 34 a decree of
absolute divorce, thus leaving a gap within which the tenancy in common can
intervene. 35 The court implied that it would have reached the same result if the
property had been awarded as alimony rather than as part of an equitable distri36
bution decree.
31. See, eg., Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937) (creditor of the husband can levy
upon and sell crops raised on entirety property after the crops have been severed); Hedge v. Hodge,
12 N.C. App. 574, 183 S.E.2d 800 (1971) (judgment creditor of the husband can reach rental income
from entireties property).
The creditor's right to reach the income from the property does not include the right to obtain
possession of the property to produce income. Grabenhofer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 131 S.E.2d
675 (1963) (judgment creditor of the husband not entitled to rent out the entireties property to
produce income); L.E. Johnson Produce v. Massengil, 23 N.C. App. 368, 208 S.E.2d 709 (1974)
(receiver may be appointed to collect the rents and profits accruing from farmland held by the entireties, but receiver has no power to rent the farmland to produce income). Further, a creditor of the
husband cannot have a transfer of entireties property set aside as fraudulent because it cuts off the
possibility of future rents and profits. L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett. 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23
(1968). Thus, creditors of the husband can reach only the income that the husband voluntarily
produces from entireties property.
This creates an inconsistency because creditors of the husband cannot reach his full interest in
the entireties property. This illogical rule was established in Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N.C. 202, 13
S.E. 790 (1891), partly in response to the Married Women's Property Rights Acts and the desire to
protect women's property rights. Reppy, supranote 18, at 5-6. The North Carolina Supreme Court
later explained its position by saying, "[I]t
should be remembered that law and logic are not always
the best of friends." Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 685, 125 S.E. 490, 492 (1924).
The courts have acknowledged one exception to the rule that creditors of the husband cannot
interfere with his right to possession. A court may order that entireties property be rented or may
award possession to the wife if necessary for alimony or child support, but the court may not order
that the property be sold. Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973); Holton v. Holton,
186 N.C. 355, 119 S.E. 751 (1923); Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, 242 S.E.2d 393 (1978).
32. At least one commentator has argued that creditors of either spouse individually should
now be able to reach 50% of the earned rents and profits of the estate during the marriage. Reppy,
supra note 18, at 8-9; see also J. WEBSTER, supra note 2, § 126 (Supp. 1985) (agreeing with Reppy).
33. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 551, 328 S.E.2d at 841. The court stated that the "issues appear to
be raised here for the first time." Id. Professor Lee has also questioned the validity, after divorce, of
a mortgage executed by one spouse on entireties property in North Carolina. R. LEE, supra note 2,
§ 115, at 54 n.83. Another commentator has questioned whether divorce converts a tenancy by the
entirety into a tenancy in common in equitable distribution states. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2,
§ 5.5, at 214-15.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a) (1984).
35. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 552-53, 328 S.E.2d at 841-42.
36. Id. at 553, 328 S.E.2d at 842. The court first found that the lien of the deed of trust attached to one-half of the property at divorce and then stated, "We find no authority for using the
Equitable Distribution Act to defeat the rights of creditors." Id. This statement indicates that the
court did not base its holding on the equitable distribution statute and that it would reach the same
conclusion in a state that allows title to entireties property to be awarded as lump sum alimony.
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If the entireties property had not been awarded to Mary Wright, the lien of
the deed of trust would have attached to Billy Wright's one-half undivided inter37
est upon divorce, based on the doctrine of after-acquired title by estoppel.
Although this precise issue has never been resolved in North Carolina, it is clear
the estoppel doctrine operates to prohibit a husband or wife who acquires an
individual interest in entireties property, either through divorce or the right of
survivorship, from denying a grant made by that spouse alone while the property
was held by the entireties. In Harrellv. Powell 38 a wife and husband jointly
conveyed entireties property. It was later determined that the husband had been
mentally incompetent for the purpose of transacting business at the time of the
joint conveyance. 39 When the husband predeceased the wife, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that title passed to the prior grantee, even though the
conveyance was in effect a conveyance from one spouse during marriage. The
wife was estopped from denying the prior grant.4° In Willis v. Willis4 1 the husband conveyed a one-half interest in entireties property to his wife. The parties
subsequently divorced. The supreme court held that the husband was estopped
from claiming the one-half interest that he otherwise would have been entitled to
upon divorce. 42 There is no reason why the Willis rule should not apply when
43
the prior grantee is a third party creditor, as was the case in Wright.
Under the law of Harrell and Willis, Branch Banking and Trust's lien
should attach to any interest acquired by Billy Wright in the entireties property
upon divorce. The Wright court held that the divorce decree gave Billy an undivided one-half interest in the entireties property as a tenant in common.
Although the conclusion that an absolute divorce converts a tenancy by the
entirety into a tenancy in common even when the property is awarded exclusively to one spouse is not illogical, neither is it mandated by case law.44 The
cases establishing the rule do not address or even contemplate the award of
property to one spouse; they merely establish a convenient rule for distributing
entireties property after divorce. 45 In 1923 the North Carolina Supreme Court
North Carolina did not allow an award of title to entireties property to the wife as alimony prior to
the passage of the equitable distribution statute. See, e.g., Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 137-38, 195
S.E.2d 552, 558 (1973) (possession may be awarded to the wife, but the court has no power to order
the property sold). See supra note 31. Other states, however, do allow such an award. See infra
note 85 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 22. In Hood v. Mercer, 150 N.C. 699, 700, 64 S.E. 897, 898 (1909), the
court stated in dicta that a conveyance by a husband alone would pass title to the grantee if the
husband later acquired title by right of survivorship.
38. 251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960).
39. Id. at 637-38, 112 S.E.2d at 82.
40. Id. at 641, 112 S.E.2d at 85.
41. 203 N.C. 517, 166 S.E. 398 (1932).
42. Id. at 519, 166 S.E. at 399.
43. Other jurisdictions have so held. See, eg., Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203,
114 A.2d 28 (1955); Hohenrath v. Wallach, 37 A.D.2d 248, 323 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1971).
44. Commentators have questioned the applicability of the rule in this situation. See supranote

33.

45. See, eg., Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973); Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C.
458, 121 S.E.2d 857 (1961); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E.2d 566 (1924); Holton v. Holton,
186 N.C. 355, 119 S.E. 751 (1923).
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wrote:

[A]s an absolute divorce terminates the marriage and unity of persons
just as completely as death itself, the 'natural and logical outcome' of
...[absolute divorce] is that the tenancy by the entirety is severed and,
this having taken place, each takes his or
her proportionate share as
46
tenant in common without survivorship.

Arguably the rule is no longer needed when a court, using its statutory power,
awards the property to one spouse. The "natural and logical outcome" of a
divorce accompanied by an award of the entireties property to one spouse may
not necessarily be the same as the "natural and logical outcome" of a divorce
unaccompanied by such an award.
The distinction becomes clear when the award of the property and its effects are examined more closely. The Wright court regarded the award of the
entireties property to the wife as a transfer of the husband's undivided one-half
interest in the property. 47 The court, however, could have concluded that the
property award more closely resembled a complete termination or defeasance of
the husband's interest in the property.
In Davis v. Bass4 8 the supreme court wrote of tenants by the entirety:
"[E]ach is deemed to be seized of the whole."' 49 Prior to divorce, each spouse
owns the whole of the entireties estate, subject only to the other's right of survivorship.5 0 Thus, one could argue that the superior court merely terminated the
husband's possible right of survivorship by awarding the entire estate to Mrs.
Wright.51 As a result, the consequences of the property award would be the
same as the consequences of the death of one spouse-that is, the "legal personage holding the estate [would be reduced] to an individuality identical with the
naturalperson. The whole estate continues in the survivor the same as it would

continue in a corporation after the death of one of the corporators. ' '5 2 After the
husband's interest is terminated, the wife holds the estate by virtue of the original grant and the right of survivorship, not by virtue of a transfer of the husband's interest to her.5 3 Under the "termination" approach, the wife holds the
54
property free of the deed of trust.
46. Holton v. Holton, 186 N.C. 355, 362, 119 S.E. 751, 754 (1923) (quoting McKinnon v.
Caulk, 167 N.C. 411, 413-14, 83 S.E. 559, 561 (1914)).
47. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 553, 328 S.E.2d at 842.
48. 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924).
49. Id. at 203, 124 S.E. at 568.
50. Id.
51. For a list of the possible interpretations of the transfers involved when entireties property is
awarded to the wife upon divorce, see Note, Creditors'Rights-Tenancy By the Entirely-Extent of
Judgment Lien FollowingDivorce Court-Awardof Land to NondebtorSpouse, Brownley v. Lincoln
County, 39 OR. L. Rnv. 194 (1960).
52. Davis, 188 N.C. at 203, 124 S.E. at 568 (quoting Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397, 399 (1856)).
It could be argued that the award of the property was merely a removal of one of the incidents of the
entireties estate, the husband's right of survivorship. See Note, supra note 51, at 195. Under this
view, the court's action was neither a transfer nor a termination of an interest, but a removal of an
incident.

53. Davis, 188 N.C. at 204-05, 124 S.E. at 568-69.
54. Although a husband could execute a valid mortgage on entities property prior to January 1,
1983, if he later died leaving the wife surviving him, the mortgage "was ipsofacto cancelled and the
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Concededly, the "termination" approach ignores the literal import of the
common-law rule that a tenancy in common results when tenants by the entirety
divorce. The situation in Wright, however, was not contemplated when the
common-law rule was developed. 55 Moreover, an award of entireties property
by the court, whether pursuant to an equitable distribution or as lump sum alimony, serves the same function that the common-law rule served-it divides
entireties property between the spouses upon divorce. It is duplicative and illogical to use both. Because the common-law rule is no longer needed when a court
has statutory authority to distribute marital property "equitably," the statute
should be viewed as a replacement for the common-law rule.
It is true that the status of the entireties property between May 5, 1982, the
date of the divorce decree, and May 6, 1982, the date of the equitable distribution decree, is uncertain under the "termination" approach. Practically, however, this one-day gap is merely a legal fiction; parties apply to the courts for a
divorce and equitable distribution of marital property to be effective at the same
time. 56 The Wright court ruled that Mary and Billy Wright each owned an
undivided one-half interest in the entireties property between May 5, 1982, and
May 6, 1982.57 Despite the literal accuracy of this conclusion under the common-law rule, no one would argue that either party could have conveyed his or
her interest to a third party during the period between divorce and equitable
distribution. The general rule is that creditors can reach only those interests
that their debtors are free to convey; 58 nonetheless, the Wright court held that
59
the creditor's lien attached during this time period.
The question whether the common-law rule that divorce converts a tenancy
by the entirety into a tenancy in common when the property is awarded to one
spouse has rarely been litigated. In Hillman v. McCutchen60 the Third District
Court of Appeal of Florida held that the length of time between the divorce and
the award of entireties property is irrelevant. The court held that title to onehalf of the entireties property vested in the husband as a tenant in common, if
only for the" 'twinkling of an eye,'" between a divorce decree and an award of
the property to the wife. 6 1 Therefore, the court allowed a mortgage executed by
the husband alone to attach to a one-half undivided interest in the property.
The court characterized the transaction as a transfer rather than as a termination of the husband's interest, adopting reasoning similar to that espoused in
entire estate was vested in the survivor." First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 201 N.C. 787, 789, 161 S.E. 484,
485 (1931). See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984 & Supp. 1985) is titled "Distribution by court of marital
property upon divorce."
57. Apparently the Wright court would hold that each spouse owned an undivided one-half

interest in the property for a moment of time if the divorce and the equitable distribution were
effectuated in the same proceeding. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 553, 328 S.E.2d at 842.
58. R. LEE, supra note 2, § 116, at 61.
59. Wright, 74 N.C. App. at 553, 328 S.E.2d at 842.
60. 166 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
61. Id. at 613.

1480

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Wright.62

Two other Florida district courts of appeal later rejected the Hillman decision.63 After a thorough consideration of the issue, the Second District Court of
Appeal of Florida in Liberman v. Kelso 64 declined to follow the Hillman reasoning on the ground that the conveyance of the entireties property to the wife was
a termination or defeasance of the husband's interest that had the same legal
effect as if the husband had died. 65 The Liberman court emphasized that a court
should not be prohibited from awarding the full and complete title to property to
one spouse at the time of divorce, even though a Florida statute expressly provided that divorce converted a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in
66
common.
Similarly, in State Department of Commerce v. Lowery 67 the First District
Court of Appeal of Florida held that a conveyance of entireties property pursuant to a divorce terminated the husband's interest in the estate so that the lien of
the husband's creditor could not reach the entireties property. 68 Although the
North Carolina courts are not bound by the decisions of the Florida courts in
Liberman and Lowery, the logic of these cases is persuasive.
The Oregon Supreme Court and a lower New Jersey court also have considered the issue presented in Wright.69 Although both of these courts, like the
court in Wright, held that a prior creditor of a husband individually acquired an
interest in entireties property awarded to the wife upon divorce, the cases are
distinguishable from Wright because of differences in state law governing the
70
incidents of entireties property.
In New Jersey a creditor of one spouse can force an involuntary sale of
62. Id. The Hillman court reasoned that, although the lower court awarded the property as
lump-sum alimony, it could have ordered the property sold and the money paid as alimony. Therefore, the Hillman court saw the lower court's decree as a "short-circuit" of a judicial sale process.
Id.
63. Liberman v. Kelso, 354 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State Dept. of Commerce v.
Lowery, 333 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
64. 354 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
65. Id. at 139.
66. Id.
67. 333 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
68. Id. at 496-97. In both Liberman and Lowery the creditor was the holder of a judgment lien
against the husband.
It is possible to distinguish Wright from the Florida cases. In the latter cases, the divorce and
the property settlement were accomplished in single dissolution proceedings. However, the Wright
court made clear that its decision would be the same in the event of a single proceeding. Wright, 74
N.C. App. at 553, 328 S.E.2d at 842.
Liberman and Lowery are distinguishable from Hillman on the grounds that in the former cases
the separation agreements, which were entered into before the divorce proceedings and which both
specified that the entireties property was awarded to the wife, were incorporated into the divorce
decree. In Hillman the court awarded the property as lump-sum alimony. It could be argued that
the separation agreements tentatively disposed of the property before the divorce, thus leaving no
gap within which the tenancy in common could intervene. The Liberman and Lowery courts, however, did not adopt this argument, and the Liberman court indicated that its decision should apply in
the Hillman situation as well. Liberman, 354 So. 2d at 139.
69. Interchange State Bank v. Riegel, 190 N.J. Super. 139, 462 A.2d 198 (1983); Brownley v.
Lincoln County, 318 Or. 7, 343 P.2d 529 (1959).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 71-83.
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entireties property during marriage to reach the debtor-spouse's one-half interest, and any interest so acquired is subject to defeasance only if the nondebtor
spouse becomes the survivor. 71 In addition, the creditor is entitled to reach the
73
72
debtor-spouse's right of survivorship. In Interchange State Bank v. Riegel
the creditor executed on a judgment and levied on the husband's one-half interest prior to the divorce decree. The court held that the divorce resulted in the
termination of the creditor's potential right of survivorship and made permanent
the creditor's one-half interest as a tenant in common, because that interest was
no longer subject to defeasance by the death of the debtor-spouse. 74 In essence,
except for removing the possibility of defeasance of the one-half interest, the
divorce decree gave the creditor no interest it did not already have. This analysis is inapplicable in North Carolina because in North Carolina a creditor of one
75
spouse cannot reach any interest in the estate during marriage.
The decision reached by the Oregon Supreme Court in Brownley v. Lincoln
County76 also occurred in a jurisdiction that is more favorable to creditors of a
tenant by the entirety than is North Carolina. 7 7 Like New Jersey, Oregon allows creditors of one spouse to foreclose on the debtor-spouse's full interest during marriage.78 In fact, the Oregon entireties estate has been described as a
"tenancy in common with an indestructible right of survivorship," rather than a
true tenancy by the entirety.79 The Brownley court, however, did not base its
decision solely on Oregon's policy of favoring creditors. Rather, the court
stated:
[S]ince it is accepted theory that a tenancy by the entirety is converted
into a tenancy in common where no award of the spouse's share is
made, it seems reasonable to us that the award be viewed as the
equivalent of a transfer by the court of the spouse's share in the estate
rather than as a judicial defeasance which cuts off the spouse's interest
in the same manner that death would do so. 80
It is not surprising that the Oregon court came to this conclusion, given the
background of Oregon cases that establish a policy of favoring creditors of a
tenant by the entirety.8 1 North Carolina, however, is at the opposite end of the
spectrum with regard to creditors' access to entireties property; in North Caro71. Interchange State Bank v. Riegel, 190 N.J. Super. 139, 143-44, 462 A.2d 198, 200 (1983).

72. Id.
73. 190 N.J. Super. 139, 462 A.2d 198 (1983).
74. Id. at 144, 462 A.2d at 200.
75. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
76. 218 Or. 7, 343 P.2d 529 (1959).
77. Professor Powell notes that "[tihe transition away from the traditional form of the tenancy
by the entirety has gone furthest in Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon," and cites
Brownley to support this proposition. R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 623, at 703 & n.32.
78. See, eg., Ganoe v. Ohmart, 121 Or. 116, 254 P. 203 (1927); Korfine v. Cole, 121 Or. 76, 252
P. 708 (1927); Howell v. Folsom, 38 Or. 184, 63 Pac. 116 (1900).
79. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 623, at 703; accord Brownley, 218 Or. at 10, 343 P.2d at
531.
80. Brownley, 218 Or. at 16, 343 P.2d at 533-34.
81. For an outline of the Oregon cases that "reveal an increasing acquiescence to the demands
of the creditor" of one tenant by the entirety, see Note, supra note 51, at 194.
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lina a creditor cannot reach any interest in the property during the marriage.8 2
Given these underlying distinctions, the Oregon and New Jersey decisions are
not persuasive in North Carolina. Moreover, state law that favors the creditor
does not change the fact an award of entireties property to one spouse upon
divorce may amount to a termination, rather than a transfer, of the other
83
spouse's interest.
Because the common-law rule that a tenancy by the entirety is converted
into a tenancy in common upon divorce should not apply when the property is
awarded to one spouse,8 4 a lien held by the creditor of a debtor-spouse should
not attach to entireties property awarded to the nondebtor-spouse as alimony or
pursuant to a separation agreement. However, for two reasons, the argument
that the lien should not attach is even stronger when the property is awarded
pursuant to the North Carolina equitable distribution statute.85
First, a termination of one spouse's interest is more consistent with the philosophy of North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20 than is a transfer of
the interest. Prior to the adoption of the North Carolina equitable distribution
statute, property of the husband could be awarded to the wife as alimony, which
was regarded as an "allowance made for the support of the wife out of the estate
of the husband."'8 6 The equitable distribution statute abandons the concept of
husband and wife holding separate estates and adopts in its place a "concept of
marriage as a partnership, a shared enterprise to which both spouses make valuable contributions, albeit in different ways." 87 The notion of a transfer of one
spouse's separate interest does not comport with the philosophy underlying equitable distribution because the statute does not regard the spouses as ever having held "separate" interests in marital property.8 8
A second factor suggesting that a lien of a creditor of one spouse individually should not attach to entireties property when that property is awarded to
the other spouse pursuant to equitable distribution is the broad discretion afforded to the courts under section 50-20. The statute provides that "[i]f the
court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall divide
the marital property equitably."8 9 This broad equitable power allows the court
82. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
85. In Hillman the property was awarded to the wife as lump-sum alimony. In Liberman and
Lowery the properties were awarded pursuant to the incorporation of separation agreements into the
divorce decrees. See supra note 68. In Brownley and InterchangeState Bank the awards were made
pursuant to equitable distribution statutes. InterchangeState Bank, 190 N.J. Super. at 142, 462

A.2d at 199; Brownley, 218 Or. at 13, 343 P.2d at 532.
In North Carolina an award of entireties property as lump-sum alimony has never been permitted. Prior to equitable distribution, a court could order the property rented out or award possession
to the wife, but could not order the sale of the property. See supra note 36.
86. Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 133, 37 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1946).
87. Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 61
N.C.L. REv.247, 247 (1983).
88. Id. at 249; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984 & Supp. 1985).

89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984) (emphasis added).
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to declare the interest of one spouse terminated so that the other spouse may
take the property unencumbered.
In analyzing the Wright issue, the creditors' interests are important and
deserve attention. 90 Indeed, many have argued that the entireties estate should
be eliminated altogether because it is unfair to creditors. 9 1 Most creditors, however, are able to protect themselves by insisting on the signatures of both spouses
when securing a lien on entireties property. 92 Clearly, tort plaintiffs have no
such opportunity. The best solution to this dilemma would be to create for tort
plaintiffs, a class of creditors in need of special protection whether or not a divorce is involved, an exception to the broader rule that shields entireties property from creditors of either spouse alone. Because creditors have been unable
to reach the interest of one spouse in entireties property in North Carolina since
1891, 93 there is no risk that a creditor will be unfairly surprised by the untimely
discovery that a note issued by one spouse is of little value. Creditors who
choose to accept such a guarantee are gambling and should suffer the conse94
quences if fortune does not fall their way.
Because so many homes are owned by tenants by the entirety in North
Carolina, public policy is an important consideration in resolving the issue in
Wright. Promoting family life and preserving the family home are important
state interests and continue after divorce when minor children are involved.
Nonetheless, North Carolina allows only a 7,500 dollar homestead exemption. 95
Because the homestead exemption in North Carolina is so meager, 96 the tenancy
by the entirety is an important protection for married as well as divorced individuals. The broad equitable powers given by section 50-20 permit a court to
protect the family homestead; for example, the court can require the debtorspouse to hold the other spouse harmless for his or her property as part of the
equitable distribution decree. Preserving the family homestead, however, should
not be left to the discretion of a court of equity. Moreover, an equitable distribution decree is no protection if the debtor-spouse simply refuses to pay his or her
debt and absconds, as was the case in Wright.
Although North Carolina General Statutes section 39-13.6 put an end to a
husband's right to execute a valid encumbrance on entireties property without
the joinder of his wife, the issue addressed in Wright will be an important and
recurring one because the statute has no effect on encumbrances executed before
90. In fact, commentators have suggested that the entireties estate be abolished because it is
unfair to creditors. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 2, at 997-98 (tenancy by the entirety is a stumbling block to creditors and should be abolished or altered).
91. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
93. The rule was established in Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N.C. 202, 13 S.E. 790 (1891).
94. It is also significant that a divorce and award of the property to the nondebtor spouse is not
the only risk that could defeat the creditor's interest; the death of the debtor spouse during the
nondebtor spouse's lifetime would have the same effect. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IC-1601(a)(1) (1984).
96. See Reppy, supra note 18, at 6 ("The exemptions given by statute in North Carolina have
always been puny compared to other states."). Reppy points out that some states exempt the entire
homestead. Id. at 6 n.17.
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1983. 97 In Wright the North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed a deed of trust
executed by a husband alone to interfere with a court's express statutory authority to award title to the family home to the wife. The Wright court failed to look
behind the transactions that occurred during the divorce and equitable distribution proceedings and to inquire into the nature of the property interests transferred thereby. That the award of the property could be viewed as a
termination, rather than a transfer, of the husband's interest in the estate was
not even discussed by the court. 98 Thus, the reasoning underlying the court's
rejection of the termination theory is left to conjecture. The North Carolina
courts should reconsider the issue and offer more than a conclusory restatement
of the common law. The "termination" approach should be acknowledged as
controlling in North Carolina.
MELISSA HELEN HILL

97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (1984).
98. See Appellee's Brief at 1-4, Wright.

Oates v. JAG: Let the Builder Beware-A Remedy for
Subsequent Purchasers of Homes in North Carolina
The purchase of a home is the largest and most important investment most
families will ever make. In addition, owning a home represents the fulfillment of
a long time dream for many home buyers. The dream can quickly turn into a
nightmare, however, upon the discovery of hidden defects in the recently
purchased house. The immediate concern of the new owners in this situation is
whether they must spend additional money on the house or whether they can
force the "builder" 1 of the house to pay for the repairs. In most jurisdictions,
the answer depends largely on whether the home buyers are the initial purchasers or "subsequent purchasers" 2 of the house.
In Oates v. JAG, Inc. 3 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether a subsequent purchaser of a defective house could maintain an action
for negligence against the builder to recover the cost of repairing the defects. A
unanimous court answered affirmatively, holding that the lack of privity between the subsequent purchaser and the builder did not bar the purchaser's negligence claim. 4 The court's decision creates a remedy for subsequent purchasers
and places North Carolina law in line with a growing trend in this area of the
law. 5 This Note analyzes the reasoning behind the court's decision in Oates and
considers the implications of that decision. It finds that although the decision
expands the class of purchasers to whom builders owe a duty of care, the decision does not render builders absolute insurers of their work. The Note concludes that the Oates court reached a proper decision, as subsequent purchasers
are generally in a position similar to that of initial purchasers. Subsequent purchasers thus deserve protection equal to that given to initial purchasers. The
Oates court, however, failed to address the question whether subsequent purchasers can maintain negligence actions against builders when the initial purchaser knew of and accepted the risk of such a defect. The Note proposes that
the court not simply apply the Oates rule in such a situation. Rather, the court
should consider the equities involved and determine whether the subsequent
purchaser should be allowed to maintain an action for negligence.
1. The term "builder" is used in this Note to refer to a person who builds and sells houses.
This Note considers only remedies available to a subsequent purchaser who purchased a house
originally purchased from the builder itself. Persons who buy a house originally purchased from
someone other than the builder have more limited remedies available and, absent fraud or misrepresentation, may be subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor. E.g., Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C.
407, 413-14, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970). For a definition of caveat emptor, see infra note 15.
2. For the purpose of this Note, the term "subsequent purchaser" is used to refer to anyone
who purchases a house from someone other than the builder of the house. Similarly, a subsequent
purchaser can be thought of as the purchaser of a used home.
3. 314 N.C. 276, 333 S.E.2d 222 (1985).
4. Id. at 281, 333 S.E.2d at 226.
5. See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983); Coburn v. Lennox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977); Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d
670 (Miss. 1983) (en bane); McMillan v. Brune-Harpeneau-Torbeck Builders, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 3d 3,
455 N.E.2d 1276 (1983); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
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Plaintiffs in Oates were the third purchasers of a dwelling and lot located in
Wake County. The property originally was owned by defendant, who in 1978

had constructed a house and made other improvements on the land. Defendant
sold the house in 1978 to a purchaser who subsequently resold the property.

Plaintiffs purchased the house from the second purchasers in 1981.6
According to their complaint, plaintiffs discovered a number of defects

shortly after moving into the house. 7 These defects included installing a cut

drain pipe in the bathroom; failing to use grade-marked lumber, which had
caused the second floor to sag; building the house so that part of the flooring had

rotted; using too few nails in places; and other violations of the North Carolina
Uniform Residential Building Code. 8 Plaintiffs alleged that the defects were the

result of defendant's negligent construction, and they sought to recover over
25,000 dollars from defendant for the cost of repairing the defects. 9

In its answer, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim for relief.10 In essence, defendant asserted that the lack of privity be-

tween it and plaintiffs barred any cause of action. 1 The trial court granted
defendant's motion. 12 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, noting
that "[n]o duty has been alleged for which the breach thereof would give rise to
an action in tort for negligence." 1 3 Furthermore, the court noted that an implied warranty of fitness is available only to the initial purchaser in North Carolina and that North Carolina has not yet extended strict liability concepts to the
construction and sale of homes.1 4 The court held that plaintiffs had "acted at
6. Oates, 314 N.C. at 277, 333 S.E.2d at 224.
7. Id.
8. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was negligent in the construction ofthe
home by:
(a) installing a cut toilet drain pipe in the upstairs bathroom,
(b) using nongrade marked lumber which caused the floor joists on the second floor to
sag, settle, and become unlevel,
(c) using an undersized stud underneath a second floor beam in a weight bearing
position,
(d) improperly installing a steel flinch plate under the second floor,
(e) creating an excessive span of the floor joists,
(f) using insufficient nails on the ledgers or beams,
(g) improperly nailing the bridging between joists and beams,
(h) using shims between floor joists and second floor flooring in an attempt to raise and
level the second floor and to disguise other negligence,
(i) using insufficient vents in the foundation walls,
() building the dwelling so that "[a] portion of the hardwood flooring was rotted," and
(k) failing in general "to conform to the customary and acceptable standards and practices" in the trade.
Oates v. JAG, Inc., 66 N.C. App. 244, 245, 311 S.E.2d 369, 370 (1984), rev'd, 314 N.C. 276, 333
S.E.2d 222 (1985).
9. Oates, 66 N.C. App. at 245, 311 S.E.2d at 370.
10. Id. at 246, 311 S.E.2d at 370. Defendant's motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I (1983).
11. Oates, 66 N.C. App. at 246, 311 S.E.2d at 370.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 244, 311 S.E.2d at 369.
14. Id. at 246-47, 311 S.E.2d at 370.
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their own risk and [were] subject to the traditional rule of caveat emptor."1
Plaintiffs appealed from this decision. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Frye, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
on the ground that "plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently states a claim for
16
negligence."
Historically, the doctrine of caveat emptor governed the sale of real property in all jurisdictions. 17 During the 1950s, however, the law began to change
as courts recognized a change in the home buying market.18 As a larger segment of the population began to purchase homes, courts realized that persons
involved in such transactions did not have equal bargaining positions. 19 Home
buyers lacked the expertise necessary to bargain effectively and were forced to
rely on the home builders.2 0 Similarly, courts realized that the size of the investment in buying a home warranted protection equal to that available in the sale of
personal property. 21 As one commentator noted, "[I]t became increasingly apparent that something was unfair in a system which conscientiously protected
the purchaser when he bought small items but left him to the mercy of caveat
emptor when he purchased a home." 22 In response, courts fashioned a number
of remedies for homebuyers, including an implied warranty of habitability, strict
24
23
liability for construction defects, and actions for negligence.
In Hartley v. Ballou 25 the North Carolina Supreme Court joined the movement away from a strict application of caveat emptor in the sale of real prop15. Id. at 247, 311 S.E.2d at 371. The term caveat emptor, "[i]et the buyer beware ... summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge and test for himself." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
16. Oates, 314 N.C. at 280, 333 S.E.2d at 225.
17. See Comment, Builder'sLiabilityfor Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN. L. REv. 607,
607 (1980); Note, Real Property Law-SubsequentPurchasers-Privityof Contract Is Not a Necessary Element of an Action in Negligence Brought by A Buyer-Vendee of Real Property Against a
Builder!Vendor-McMillanv. Brune-Harpenau-Torbeck Builders, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 3d 3, 455 N.E.2d
1276 (1983), 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 801, 801 (1984); see also McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 283,
398 A.2d 1283, 1287 (1979) (discussing the history of the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to the
sale of real property). For a North Carolina decision stating the traditional rule, see Buckman v.
Bragaw, 192 N.C. 152, 134 S.E. 422 (1926).
18. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 283-84, 398 A.2d 1283, 1287 (1979).
19. Id. at 287-89, 398 A.2d at 1289-90.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 287-90, 398 A.2d at 1288-90.
22. Roberts, The Case ofthe Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing MerchantDidIt, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835, 837 (1967); see also Haskell, The Casefor Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEO. LJ. 633, 633 (1965) (noting that the law provided more protection to the purchaser of a 79 cent dog leash than to the purchaser of a house).
23. At least three states have extended strict liability in tort principles to the sale of homes. See
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1969) (doctrine
of strict liability in tort can be applied to home builders); Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d
1351, 1357 (D.C. 1978) (the law of products liability applies not only to sale of goods but also to sale
of newly constructed homes); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 432-33, 437 A.2d 925, 929-30
(1981) (complaint based on strict liability in tort for material defects not barred by lack of privity
between subsequent purchasers and defendant). See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981) (discussing the remedies available to subsequent purchasers of residential real property).
24. See Comment, supra note 17, at 610-18.
25. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
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erty. 2 6 The court in Hartley held that the initial purchaser of a defective house

was entitled to recover for breach of an implied warranty of habitability. 27 The

court's holding in Hartley was recently expanded in Gaito v. Auman. 28 In Gaito

the supreme court held that the initial purchaser's action for breach of implied
warranty was not barred because of the tenancies that preceded plaintiff's
purchase of the house.29 Rather, the prior occupancy by tenants was simply one
of the factors to be considered in deciding whether the purchasers could recover
under the implied warranty. 30 Although in Hartley and Gaito the court greatly
expanded the rights of homebuyers in North Carolina, the court did3 1not go so
far as to make home builders strictly liable for construction defects.

The problems faced by subsequent purchasers of real property are more
complex than those faced by initial purchasers. The lack of privity between a
subsequent purchaser and the builder often bars subsequent purchasers from
relying on breach of an implied warranty as a basis for recovery when they

purchase defective houses. 32 Subsequent purchasers, however, are not without
remedies. Such purchasers have been allowed to maintain negligence actions
against builders on the long-accepted theory that privity is not a necessary element in a negligence action. 33 At least eleven jurisdictions have held that subse-

26. Id. at 60-61, 209 S.E.2d at 782.
27. Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783. Plaintiffs in Hartley discovered flooding and leakage problems
in the basement of their new house shortly after moving in. They subsequently filed suit against the
builder of the house to recover losses suffered as a result of water damage to the basement. Among
other charges, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had warranted that the house had been waterproofed
and that the floor in the basement was of sufficient quality to prevent any leakage. Id. at 53-54, 209
S.E.2d at 777-78.
28. 313 N.C. 243, 327 S.E.2d 870 (1985).
29. Id. at 251, 327 S.E.2d at 876. In Gaito the house in dispute was built by the defendant in
November 1973. From 1974 to 1978 the house was rented to three different tenants. Id. at 245, 327
S.E.2d at 873. In 1978 plaintiffs purchased the house from the defendant. Id. Shortly after moving
in, plaintiffs discovered that the house's air conditioning system did not work properly. After defendant refused to repair the system, plaintiffs paid for the repairs themselves. Id. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against defendant, seeking $3,500 in damages for a breach of warranty. Id. at 244,
327 S.E.2d at 872.
In Gaito the court noted that the implied warranty of habitability applied only to "recently
completed" dwellings. Id. at 250, 327 S.E.2d at 876. Further, the court adopted a standard of
reasonableness for determining whether a dwelling has been recently completed. Id. Among the
factors to be considered in applying the reasonableness standard are the age of the house, the use to
which it has been put, its maintenance, the nature of the defects, and the parties' expectations. Id.
The intervening tenancies were thus just an additional factor to be considered in this determination.
30. Id. at 251, 327 S.E.2d at 876. In an earlier decision the North Carolina Court of Appeals
extended the implied warranty of habitability to a party who had inherited the house from the initial
purchaser. Strong v. Johnson, 53 N.C. App. 54, 58-59, 280 S.E.2d 37,40 (1981). For a discussion of
Gaito and the implied warranty of habitability in North Carolina, see Note, Another Look at the
Implied Warranty ofHabilitabilityin North Carolina, 64 N.C.L. REv. 869 (1986).
31. See Oates, 66 N.C. App. at 246-47, 311 S.E.2d at 370; see supratext accompanying note 14.
But see supra note 23 and accompanying text (doctrine of strict liability in tort being applied to home
builders).
32. See Gaito, 313 N.C. at 250, 327 S.E.2d at 876 (noting that the case in which the doctrine
was adopted limits the implied warranty of habitability to initial vendees). But cf infra note 36
(noting that Gaito can also be read to imply a willingness on the part of the North Carolina Supreme
Court to extend the warranty to a subsequent purchaser on the right facts). See generally Annot., 10
A.L.R.4th 385 (1981) (discussing remedies available to subsequent purchasers of residential real
property).
33. See, eg., Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn., 567, 574-75, 378 A.2d 599, 602 (1977).
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), is a landmark case in which

19861

PROPERTYLAW

1489

quent purchasers can maintain negligence actions against a home builder.3 4 In
addition, a few jurisdictions have extended the implied warranty of habitability

to subsequent purchasers.3 5 North Carolina has not yet joined the courts that
extend the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers.3 6 In
Oates, however, the court did allow the subsequent purchasers to maintain a
37
negligence action for defective construction against the home builder.
The Oates court began its discussion by recognizing that many jurisdictions
deny relief based on an implied warranty theory when the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser rather than the initial buyer.38 In Oates, however, plaintiffs had
alleged only negligence, not implied warranty.3 9 In holding that a subsequent
purchaser can maintain an action for negligence, the Oates court relied primarily
on the reasoning of the Florida Court of Appeals in Simmons v. Owens 4° to
support its holding.4 1 Plaintiff in Simmons was a subsequent purchaser who
sued the builder for negligence after discovering defects in the house shortly
after moving in. Like plaintiffs' complaint in Oates, the complaint in Simmons

was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a cause of action. 42 A divided
panel of the district court of appeals reversed, noting that defendant had failed
to cite a single case in which the purchaser of a used home was not allowed to
sue the builder for negligent construction. 43 The Simmons court reasoned:

We must be realistic. The ordinary purchaser of a home is not qualified to determine when or where a defect exists. Yet, the purchaser

makes the biggest and most important investment in his or her life and,
more times than not, on a limited budget. The purchaser can ill afford

to suddenly find a latent defect in his or her home that completely
destroys the family's budget and have no remedy or recourse. This

happens too often. The careless work of contractors, who in the past
the New York Court of Appeals became the first court to hold that an action in negligence was not
barred by the lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant.
34. See Oates, 314 N.C. at 281, 333 S.E.2d at 226; Annot, 10 A.L.R. 4th 385 (1981) (discussing
the remedies available to subsequent purchasers of real property).
35. See, eg., Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Terlinde v.
Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo.
1979).
36. In Strong v. Johnson, 53 N.C. App. 54, 59, 280 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1981), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals indicated that it did not "intimate any opinion" on whether the implied warranty
of habitability should be extended to subsequent purchasers. In Gaito v. Auman, however, the court
of appeals noted that the logic of its holding would apply in the case of a subsequent purchaser.
Gaito v. Auman, 70 N.C. App. 21, 29 n.1, 318 S.E.2d 555, 560 n.1 (1984), affid, 313 N.C. 243, 329
S.E.2d 870 (1985). The supreme court in Gaito disavowed any inference that could be drawn from
the dictum of the appellate court that its decision would also apply to subsequent purchasers. Gaito,
313 N.C. at 251, 327 S.E.2d at 876. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has not yet so
held, a reading of the supreme court's opinion in Gaito suggests that the court might be willing to
extend the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers on the right facts. See Note,
supra note 30, at 876-78.
37. Oates, 314 N.C. at 281, 333 S.E.2d at 226.
38. Id. at 279, 333 S.E.2d at 225. See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981) (discussing
the remedies available to subsequent purchasers of real property).
39. Oates, 314 N.C. at 279, 333 S.E.2d at 225.
40. 363 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
41. Oates, 314 N.C. at 280-81, 333 S.E.2d at 225-26.
42. Simmons, 363 So. 2d at 143.
43. Id.
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have been insulated from liability, must cease or they must accept fi-

nancial responsibility for their negligence. In our judgment, building
contractors should be held to the general standard of reasonable care

for the protection of anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by
their negligence. 44

Although recognizing that the Florida Supreme Court had not yet addressed the question, the Oates court stated that it was "persuaded by the rea-

soning contained in the intermediate appellate court's decision."'45 The court
further stated that "[t]he reasoning of the Court in Simmons convinces us that a
subsequent purchaser can recover in negligence against the builder of the property if the subsequent purchaser can prove
that he has been damaged as a proxi'46
mate result of the builder's negligence."
The reasoning of the courts in several of the cases cited in Oates also supports the holding in Oates. In Terlinde v. Neely 47 the South Carolina Supreme

Court held that a subsequent purchaser could maintain an action in negligence
against a home builder. 48 In rejecting the argument that privity was essential to
the cause of action, the Terlinde court noted that the key inquiry was foresee-

ability. 49 Further, it was "clearly foreseeable" that more than one purchaser
would occupy the house. Thus, plaintiff purchaser was a "member of the class

for which the house was constructed." 50 The Terlinde court went on to adopt a

"stream of commerce" analysis, holding that "[b]y placing this product into the
stream.. . the builder owed a duty of care to those who will use his product, so
as to render him accountable for negligent workmanship." 5' Seeking to protect
innocent purchasers from latent defects, the court stated that any reasoning that

would "arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an obstruction to someone equally as
deserving is incomprehensible." 5 2
44. Id. This passage was cited in full in the Oates decision. Oates, 314 N.C. at 280-81, 333
S.E.2d at 225-26.
45. Id. at 281, 333 S.E.2d at 226.
46. Id. As part of its holding, the Oates court rejected the court of appeals' assertion that the
defects in plaintiffs' house were not latent. The supreme court noted that "[n]owhere in the pleadings is there any allegation that the defects were obvious or discoverable." Id. Rather, the defects
listed in plaintiffs' complaint were such "that a jury could find they would not ordinarily be discovered by a purchaser during a reasonable inspection." Id. at 281-82, 333 S.E.2d at 226.
The court of appeals' discussion on whether the defects were latent was prompted by its earlier
decision in Sullivan v. Smith, 56 N.C. App. 525, 289 S.E.2d 870, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 392, 294
S.E.2d 220 (1982). In Sullivan the court of appeals upheld the right of a subsequent purchaser to sue
a building contractor for negligent construction of a fireplace. Id. at 527-28, 289 S.E.2d at 871-72.
In Oates the court of appeals distinguished the case before it from Sullivan on the ground that the
defects in Oates were readily discoverable. Oates, 66 N.C. App. at 248, 311 S.E.2d at 371. At the
same time, the court of appeals did not address the direct conflict between its primary holding in
Oates that no cause of action in negligence existed for a subsequent purchaser and its holding in
Sullivan. Thus, although the court of appeals arguably distinguished the two cases, it did not sufficiently reconcile the two holdings. The supreme court in Oates did not discuss Sullivan.
47. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
48. Id. at 398-99, 271 S.E.2d at 769-70. Plaintiff in Terlinde sued on the theory of breach of an
implied warranty of habitability and in negligence to recover for cracks in the foundation of the
house. Id. at 395-96, 271 S.E.2d at 768.
49. Id. at 398-99, 271 S.E.2d at 769-70.
50. Id. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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In Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Ina 53 the Mississippi Supreme Court also
held that a subsequent purchaser was entitled to recover damages for negligent
construction and that privity was not required in such an action. 54 The Keyes
court noted that most homebuyers lack the knowledge and expertise to discover
all defects in a house. 5" The court also noted that a rule denying negligence
actions to subsequent purchasers would "[promote] an injustice against remote
purchasers and ... is not based on sound reasoning."' 56 Like the Terlinde court,
the Keyes court was concerned with fashioning "some legal framework ... to
protect innocent purchasers."' 57 The reasons that support protecting initial purchasers apply equally to subsequent purchasers, the court noted. 58 Further, allowing subsequent purchasers to maintain an action for negligence against home
builders will not expand the duty owed by such persons because builders will be
under the same duty to exercise reasonable care. 59
In McMillan v. Brune-Harpenau-Torbeck Builders, Inc.60 the Ohio
Supreme Court overruled an earlier decision that had denied the right of subsequent purchasers to maintain an action for negligence against a builder.6 1 The
McMillan court's decision was based primarily on the fact "[n]o sound policy
reasons exist to prevent the extension of [a builder's duty to exercise reasonable
care] to all subsequent vendees as well." 62 In support of this proposition, the
McMillan court noted that adopting such a rule would not render builders insurers of their work.63 Even under this rule, builders will be liable only for failing
to exercise reasonable care. Further, plaintiffs will still have the burden of proving all the traditional elements of negligence. 64 The McMillan court also
pointed out that continuation of the prior rule would allow builders to avoid
liability altogether through the use of a "strawman." 65
Although the Oates decision arguably is in line with the current trend, 66 the
Oates rule has not been universally accepted. Some courts have held that no
67
purchaser can maintain an action to recover only for negligent construction.
These decisions, however, rest on respective state tort law that denies relief for
53. 439 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983). Plaintiff in Keyes also sued to recover for problems with the
foundation under both the breach of an implied warrenty of habitability and negligence theories. Id.

at 670.
54. Id. at 673.
55. Id. at 671-72.
56. Id. at 671.
57. Id. at 672.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 673.
60. 8 Ohio St. 3d 3, 455 N.E.2d 1276 (1983).
61. Id. at 4, 455 N.E.2d at 1277, overruling Insurance Co. of N.A. v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64
Ohio St. 2d 269, 416 N.E.2d 623 (1980).
62. Id. at 4, 455 N.E.2d at 1278.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 5, 455 N.E.2d at 1278. A "strawman" is a "front" or "a person who is put up in

name only to take part in a deal."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1274 (5th ed. 1979).

66. See supra text accompanying note 34.
67. See, eg., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 176-78, 441 N.E.2d 324, 326-27 (1982);
Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882-84 (Mo. 1978).
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simple property damages. 6 8 As one court noted, the "buyer's desire to enjoy the
69
benefit of his bargain is not an interest that tort law generally protects."
70
More significantly, the Alabama Supreme Court in Wooldridge v. Rowe

recently held that the lack of privity between a subsequent purchaser and a
builder barred the purchaser's negligence claim. 71 Absent privity, the doctrine
of caveat emptor applied to the purchaser.72 The Wooldridge court stated:
Although we have abrogated the caveat emptor rule in sales of

new residential real estate by a builder/vendor.., we are not inclined
in this case to depart from a longstanding rule which provides cer-

tainty in this area of the law. A purchaser may protect
himself by an
73
express agreement in the deed or contract of

sale.

Dissenting opinions in other jurisdictions also have argued against the
adoption of the rule accepted by the Oates court. In a dissent from the McMillan opinion, Judge Holmes expressed concern that the majority's decision moved

Ohio law "in the direction of [making] the builder/vendor.., an insurer" of his
or her work. 74 Holmes expressed the belief that subsequent purchasers are able
to protect themselves through the bargaining process by insisting on an express
warranty in the deed or contract of sale, as suggested by the Wooldridge court. 75
Holmes also argued that there "must be a point where builders and developers

know that they will no longer be subject to allegations of negligent construction."' 76 Moreover, Holmes asserted that any extension of liability in this area
77
should have come from the Ohio General Assembly.

In Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller 78 Judge Rovira argued in dissent
that tort law should not protect "disappointed expectations."' 79 Rather, tort law

should protect parties only from physical harm.80 Rovira also asserted that no

68. See, eg., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 176-77, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1982);
Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978). Explaining why it refused to allow an
action for negligence in the construction of a house, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
A duty to use ordinary care and skill is not imposed in the abstract.... Traditionally,
interests which have been deemed entitled to protection in negligence have been related to
safety or freedom from physical harm. Thus, where personal injury is threatened, a duty in
negligence has been readily found.... However, where mere deterioration or loss of bargain is claimed, the concern is with a failure to meet some standard of quality. This standard of quality must be defined by reference to that which the parties have agreed upon.
Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 882.
69. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill.
2d 171, 177, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1982).
70. 477 So. 2d 296 (Ala. 1985).
71. Id. at 298. Plaintiffs in Wooldridge sued to recover for damages resulting from problems
with a fireplace. Id. at 297.
72. Id. at 298.
73. Id.
74. McMillan, 8 Ohio St. 3d at 8, 455 N.E.2d at 1280 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
75. Id. at 9, 455 N.E.2d at 1281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76. Id (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 9, 445 N.E.2d at 1281-82 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
78. 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983).

79. Id. at 1048 (Rovira, I., dissenting).
80. Id. Judge Rovira criticized the majority for failing to distinguish between a duty imposed
in tort law and a duty imposed by contract law. He noted, "The effect of the majority opinion is to
blur the distinction between tort and contract. The duties imposed by the two doctrines are different
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authority in tort law supported limiting liability to latent defects as most of the
decisions in this area have done. 81 But perhaps the most compelling aspect of
Rovira's dissent was his presentation of a slightly different fact situation. In
most situations the initial purchaser simply buys the house and later sells it to
the subsequent purchaser. In such a situation the defect is discovered for the
first time by the second purchaser. What if, Rovira asked, the initial purchaser
is aware of and accepts the defect at the time of purchase?82 This scenario could
occur if the negligent construction is done at the request of the initial purchaser
or if the initial purchaser simply accepts the defect with a corresponding reduction in price. In such a transaction the builder arguably is insulated from liabil83
ity by the initial purchaser's contributory negligence or assumption of risk.
But these defenses may not be available to the builder in an action by a subsequent purchaser.8 4 Rovira argued that "the specter of a claim by a subsequent
purchaser" may limit the rights of the initial parties to allocate the risk of the
transaction. No sound policy exists, Rovira argued, for placing such limits on
85
these rights.
Like Justice Holmes in McMillan, Rovira argued that such a change in the
law was better left to the legislature. 86 Further, Rovira noted that the inability
of the builder to disclaim or otherwise allocate the economic risk in a subsequent
87
purchase argued against extending the builder's duty to subsequent buyers.
Although these arguments have merit, they are outweighed by the policies
supporting the Oates decision. The decision does not make home builders in
North Carolina insurers of their work. A plaintiff still must prove all the traditional elements of negligence to win his or her case:8 8 that the builder failed to
exercise reasonable care and that this failure proximately caused the problems in
the plaintiff's house. Moreover, the holding in Oates does not alter the standard
by which reasonable care will be measured. Just as before Oates, builders will
not be liable for minor defects 89 or for obvious or readily discoverable defects. 90
and arise out of different policy considerations. They should be kept conceptually distinct." Id. at
1050 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1049-50 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id. Rovira again cited the blurred distinction between tort and contract law to explain this
problem. He stated:
If the builder has actually breached a legal, as opposed to contractual, duty to all foreseeable purchasers-that is, both first and subsequent purchasers-the fact that he built to the
specifications of the first purchaser may not be relevant to the question of liability to subsequent purchasers, because the contributory negligence of the first purchaser may not be
imputed to subsequent purchasers.
Id. at 1050 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1048 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1051 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1048 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
88. See Comment, supra note 17, at 611, 623; Note, supra note 17, at 809.
89. See Comment, supra note 17, at 623.
90. See CosmopolitanHomes, 663 P.2d at 1045. The Oates court did not specifically hold that a
cause of action for negligent construction could be maintained only for latent defects. Its refutation
of the court of appeals' finding with respect to the obviousness of the defects, however, implies that
this is the law in North Carolina. See supra note 46.
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Finally, actions for negligent construction will be limited by the relevant statutes
of limitation or repose. 9 1
The decision in Oates does expand the scope of the duty owed by home
builders to include subsequent purchasers in addition to initial purchasers. But
the reasons for this expansion are compelling. Subsequent purchasers of personal property are not excluded for that reason alone from the class of persons
to whom a manufacturer owes a duty of care. 92 Further, a subsequent purchaser of real estate is in a very similar position to that of the initial purchaser.
Both are innocent purchasers who lack the expertise and knowledge necessary to
uncover every latent defect. Both are making large investments and must rely
on the good workmanship of the builder. Thus, both classes of purchasers deserve equal protection.
Although it is conceivable that subsequent purchasers could protect themselves through express warranties from the seller, this may not be a satisfactory
solution to the problem. It may be unrealistic to assume that sellers will agree to
accept liability for latent defects in the house arising from the builder's negligent
construction. Moreover, such a warranty would shift the liability for faulty construction from the builder to the innocent first purchaser. It is unclear whether
any policy arguments could support such a result.
Similarly, the argument that such decisions are best left to state legislatures
is not very persuasive. Courts have historically taken it upon themselves to act
without legislative initiative. A clear example in North Carolina is the supreme
court's decision to create a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of
habitability in Hartley.93 The argument that legislative action should be required is even less persuasive when one considers the strength of the building
industry lobby in most states. As one commentator noted, the existence of these
strong lobbies makes it almost impossible to pass legislation expanding or ex91. The court in Oates held that such actions in North Carolina will be controlled by the sixyear limit imposed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5)(a) (1983), which reads:
No action to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition or an improvement to real property shall be brought more than six years from the later
of the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action or
substantial completion of the improvement.
Oates, 314 N.C. at 282, 333 S.E.2d at 226.
The court rejected defendant's claim that the action was controlled by the three-year limitation
on actions "[flor criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not
arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated" in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (1983). Oates, 314
N.C. at 284, 333 S.E.2d at 227.
In Evans v. Mitchell, 74 N.C. App. 732, 733, 329 S.E.2d 681, 681-82 (1985), the court of appeals relied on its holding in Oates to deny a subsequent purchaser's right to sue for negligent construction. The supreme court, however, remanded the cause of action for reconsideration in light of
its holding in Oates. Evans v. Mitchell, 314 N.C. 531, 335 S.E.2d 315 (1985). On remand, the court
of appeals recognized that plaintiffs had a cause of action even though they were not the initial
purchasers of the house. Evans v. Mitchell, 77 N.C. App. 598, 599, 335 S.E.2d 758, 759 (1985). The
court noted, however, that plaintiffs' complaint was filed ten years after the house was built by
defendant. Thus, the action was barred by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5)(a) (1983). Evans, 77 N.C.
App. at 599, 335 S.E.2d at 759.
92. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), a landmark case
in which the New York Court of Appeals held that an action in negligence was not barred by the
lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant manufacturer.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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tending the liability of builders. 94 It is thus appropriate and arguably necessary
for courts to act if subsequent purchasers are to be protected.
Despite the merits of the Oates decision, it leaves some unanswered questions. As discussed in Judge Rovira's dissent in Cosmopolitan Homes,9 5 a situation might arise in which the builder and initial purchaser had allocated the risk
of defective construction to the initial purchaser. Should the builder be held
liable for defects if the initial purchaser knew about the negligent construction
and consented to it or should the initial purchaser be accountable because he or
she accepted the risks? The arguments supporting the subsequent purchaser's
action for negligence against the builder are weaker in this situation. It is more
logical to insulate a builder from liability when the initial purchaser accepted the
defect. In this situation the North Carolina Supreme Court should not simply
apply the Oates rule and allow the subsequent purchaser to maintain an action
for negligence against the builder. Rather, the court should consider the equities
involved and determine which party should bear the loss: the builder, the subsequent purchaser, or the initial purchaser who accepted the defects.
Despite its failure to address this issue, the Oates court reached the appropriate result. The policy arguments supporting protection for initial purchasers
apply equally to subsequent purchasers. Moreover, no sound policy reasons justify relieving a builder of liability simply because of a subsequent sale. Not only
would such a policy be unsound, but, as noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, it
would allow builders to insulate themselves from liability to buyers through the
96
use of a strawman.
The decision in Oates leaves unchanged the duty of care owed by builders
but holds that subsequent purchasers may recover for a breach of that duty. The
holding does not impose an undue burden on builders in North Carolina, nor
does it make them insurers of their work. It does, however, represent a welcome
movement away from the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor and a movement toward providing much-needed protection for subsequent purchasers of residential
97
real property.
DWIGHT

F. HOPEWELL

94. See Note, supra note 17, at 809-10.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
96. See supra text accompanying note 65.
97. The Oates decision was limited to the subsequent purchase of residential real property. It is
unclear whether the Oates court would extend its holding to the subsequent purchase of commercial
real property. A court might find that commercial purchasers are able to protect themselves through
the bargaining process and thus decline to extend the Oates rule to this class of purchasers.

Walls v. Grohman: Adverse Possession in Mistaken
Boundary Cases
Ownership of real property has long been an important element of western
society due to the numerous rights and benefits it provides. Along with these
rights and benefits, however, comes a responsibility to make productive use of or

at least to maintain exclusive control of one's land. When a landowner fails to
fulfill this responsibility, statutes of limitation provide the means whereby an
adverse possessor can acquire title to the property and thereby extinguish the
legal interest of the landowner.'
Claims of adverse possession can arise in various ways. 2 One way, the mistaken boundary case, arises when landowners occupy land to a certain line beyond their true boundary, based on an honest belief that the line is in fact the
true boundary, only to later discover that they were mistaken. 3 In Walls v.
Grohman 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue whether such
landowners can acquire title by adverse possession to the land held under mistake. The court rejected the then existing rule and held that landowners who
mistakenly occupy beyond their true boundary can acquire title by adverse
5
possession.
1. P. HETRicK, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA, § 286,

at

309 (1981);

see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-35, -38, -39, -40 (1983). Adverse possession statutes serve two primary
purposes. First, by allowing adverse claimants who remain in possession for the requisite period to
acquire title, they encourage landowners to use and control their land. Second, by barring recovery
after the period has expired, they discourage lawsuits based on ancient title defects and protect
persons who have long held possession and ostensibly own the land. P. HETIcK, supra, § 286, at
310.
2. Besides mistaken boundary cases, the subject of this Note, other ways that claims of adverse
possession can arise include intentional possession of the land of another for the purpose of acquiring
title and assertion of adverse possession to remove defects in a record title. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 300-01 (1975).
3. Mistaken boundary cases frequently arise because of a mistaken belief that a certain fence
or other visible line marks the true boundary. 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1159, at 843 (3d ed. 1975). They also can arise when a strip of land is intended to be included in a
conveyance, but is omitted because of an error in surveying or in drafting the deed description. See
infra note 7 and accompanying text. A related type of case, not specifically discussed in this Note,
involves a claim of adverse possession or prescriptive easement based on the encroachment of a
building or other structure. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1965). A second related situation involves a claim based on mistaken improvement of land owned by someone else. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 1-340 to -351 (1983); Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C.L. REV. 37
(1985).
4. 315 N.C. 239, 337 S.E.2d 556 (1985).
5. Id. at 244, 337 S.E.2d at 559. For general background on how various courts have resolved
this issue, see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.5, at 785-91 (1952 & Supp. 1977); 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1013(2)(f)(i), at 91-31 to -34 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1984); 5 G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2548, at 631-34 (J.
Grimes replacement 1979); 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 3, § 1559, at 843-47; H. TIFFANY, TIFFANY
ON REAL PROPERTY § 551, at 482-83 (abr. 3d ed. 1970); Bordwell, Mistake in Adverse Possession, 7
IOWA L. BULL. 129 (1922); Darling, Adverse Possession in Boundary Cases, 19 OR. L. REV. 117
(1940); Day, The Validation ofErroneously Located Boundariesby Adverse Possession and Related
Doctrines, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 245 (1957); Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61
WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 339-41 (1983); Note, Adverse Possession-Intent as a Requisite in Mistaken
Boundary Cases, 33 N.C.L. REV. 632 (1955). For digests of cases on this issue, see Annot., 80
A.L.R.2d 1171 (1961); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 14 (1935).

1986]

PROPERTY LAW

1497

This Note first summarizes the facts and decision in the Walls case and

outlines the elements necessary to establish title by adverse possession. It then
describes the three basic rules that have been followed by various jurisdictions
regarding adverse possession in mistaken boundary situations. The Walls opinion is analyzed in light of these rules and the prior development of the law in this
area in North Carolina. The Note concludes that the Walls decision signifi-

cantly improves the law of adverse possession in North Carolina.
Plaintiffs in Walls sought to quiet title to a fifty-foot strip of land on the

northern side of their property. 6 Defendants owned the adjoining property and
had mistakenly believed that their land included the strip.7 When a controversy

over title to the land ensued, defendants claimed title to the strip by adverse
possession.8
The referee9 hearing the case found that plaintiffs held record title, but concluded that defendants had acquired the disputed strip by adverse possession. 10
The district court reversed the referee, finding that defendants' possession was
under a mistaken belief that the boundary described in their deed encompassed

the strip and holding that such possession was not adverse under North Carolina
2
law. 1 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's order.'
On discretionary review the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged

that the lower courts correctly applied the then existing law of the state.' 3 The
court concluded, however, that the existing rule was unreasonable and held:
[When a landowner, acting under a mistake as to the true boundary
between his property and that of another, takes possession of the land

believing it to be his own and claims title thereto, his possession and
claim of title is adverse. If such adverse possession meets all other

requirements and continues for the requisite statutory period, the
claimant acquires title by adverse possession even though the claim of
6. Walls, 315 N.C. at 240, 337 S.E.2d at 557.
7. Id. The tracts owned by both landowners had originally belonged to the parents of defendant Catherine Grohman. Defendants claimed that their deed was supposed to have included the
disputed strip. The strip was apparently omitted from their deed through an error in surveying or in
drafting the deed description, because the total road frontage of the tracts Catherine's parents conveyed was approximately 50 feet less than what they owned. Id. at 241-42, 337 S.E.2d at 557-58.
8. Id.
9. The trial court appointed a referee under N.C. R. Civ. P. 53, upon plaintiffs' motion. Record at 6. Rule 53 provides for the appointment of a referee by the court "[w]here the case involves a
complicated question of boundary." N.C. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(2)(c).
10. Walls, 315 N.C. at 240, 337 S.E.2d at 557. The conclusions of the referee included the
following:
3. [Defendant] Mrs. Catherine Grohman has been in exclusive possession of that part of
the Walls tract south of the line called for in her deed under a claim of right and title ....
4. Such possession by the Grohmans has been actual, open, hostile, exclusive and continuous for a period of more than thirty years before the Plaintiffs were conveyed their tract.
The possession has been characterized as that of an owner exercising exclusive dominion
over the lands now in dispute up to a marked and known line in making such use of the
land as it is reasonably susceptible of in its condition.
Id. at 242, 337 S.E.2d at 558.
11. Id. at 243-44, 337 S.E.2d at 558-59.
12. Walls v. Grohman, 72 N.C. App. 443, 324 S.E.2d 874, rev'd, 315 N.C. 239, 337 S.E.2d 556
(1985).
13. See Walls, 315 N.C. at 244, 248, 337 S.E.2d at 559, 561.
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title is founded on a mistake.14
Based on this newly adopted rule, the supreme court concluded that defendants

5
had acquired title to the disputed strip by adverse possession.'
To acquire title to real property by adverse possession in North Carolina
the claimant must establish the following: that there was actual possession of
the property in question,' 6 and that the possession was hostile and exclusive,17

open and notorious,' 8 and continuous and uninterrupted 19 for the requisite stat-

utory period. 20 It also has been required "that the possessor.., occupy the land
14. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562. Although this holding seems reasonably clear,
other language in the opinion raises several questions regarding the precise intent now required to
establish adverse possession in mistaken boundary cases. See infra notes 46-62 and accompanying

text.
15. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562. The court expressly overruled, "to the extent
they apply a different rule," the following cases: Price v. Whisnant, 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851
(1952); Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N.C. 255, 63 S.E.2d 630 (1951); Sipe v. Blankenship, 37 N.C. App.
499, 246 S.E.2d 527 (1978), cerL denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 470 (1979); Garris v. Butler, 15
N.C. App. 268, 189 S.E.2d 809 (1972). The court also effectively overruled Williamson v. Vann, 42
N.C. App. 569, 257 S.E.2d 102 (1979), to the extent that it relied on Garris.
16. P. HETaICK,supra note 1, § 288, at 310-12.
Any usage of land will be regarded as an actual possession of the land if the claimant
makes such use of the land as its quantity, character, nature, location and circumstances
will permit, and ifthe use of such land is the same as is customary in the community by the
title owners of similar land....
In short, actual possession means subjecting the land to the will and dominion of
the claimant, to the exclusion of others, and in making the ordinary use and taking the
ordinary profits of which it is susceptible, such acts to be so repeated as to show that they
are done in the character of owner, and not merely as an occasional trespasser.
Id. at 311-12.
17. Id. § 289, at 312-15. "The requirement that possession must be hostile in order to ripen
title by adverse possession does not import ill will or animosity but only that the one in possession of
the lands claims the exclusive right thereto." State v. Brooks, 275 N.C. 175, 180, 166 S.E.2d 70, 73
(1969). "A 'hostile' use is simply a use ofsuch nature and exercised under such circumstances as to
manifest and give notice that the use is being made under claim of right." Dulin v. Faires, 266 N.C.
257, 261, 145 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1966). In contrast to Brooks and Dulin, other cases have stated that
for the possession to be hostile, there must be a conscious intent to claim against the true owner. P.
HETRICK, supra note 1, § 289, at 313. The requirement of such a conscious intent was rejected in
Walls. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text,
18. P. HETRICK, supra note 1, § 290, at 315-16.
[Open and notorious] means that the record owner of the real property involved must be
given actual notice of the hostile possession of the claimant or the possession must be so
open, visible or notorious that he is presumed to have constructive notice of the adverse
claim.... The possession must be decided and as notorious as the nature of the land will
permit, affording unequivocal indication to all persons that the claimant is exercising the
dominion of owner over the land involved.
Id. at 315.
19. Id. § 291, at 316-18.
Intermittent, occasional, or periodic possessions do not constitute the continuity of
possession required to gain title by adverse possession. While the possession need not be
unceasing,there must be evidence that warrants the inference that the actual use and occupation of the land have extended over the required period, and that during that time the
claimant has from time to time, continuously subjected some part of the disputed land to
the only use of which it was susceptible.
Id. at 316.
20. The normal statutory period for adverse possession is 20 years. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1.40
(1983). Under color of title, the statutory period is seven years. Id. § 1-38. Against the State of
North Carolina, the statutory periods for adverse possession are 30 years normally and 21 years
under color of title. Id. § 1-35. Under color of title, an adverse possessor can only acquire title to
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in question with the intent to claim title to the land occupied to the exclusion of
any recognition of the true owner's rights."' 2 1 This last requirement, which
overlaps the requirement that the possession be hostile and exclusive, 22 has been
23
the deciding factor in mistaken boundary cases in North Carolina.

Numerous decisions in various jurisdictions have addressed the issue of adverse possession in mistaken boundary situations. 24 Many of these decisions,
however, fail to define clearly and apply consistently the legal principles involved.2 5 Nevertheless, three basic rules can be identified from these
26
decisions.
The majority rule,2 7 as enunciated in the leading case of French v. Pearce,28
states that visible possession "with an intention to possess" constitutes adverse
possession. 29 Under this objective rule, 30 "it is only necessary for a person to
enter and take possession of land as his own."'3 1 When a person "enters on land
believing and claiming it to be his own, . . . [t]he very nature of the act is an
"the land embraced within the deed." See Price v. Tomrich Corp., 275 N.C. 385, 391-92, 167 S.E.2d
766, 771 (1969). Thus, color of title is not a factor in mistaken boundary cases of the sort involved in
Walls, because these cases involve landowners who occupy land beyond the boundary described in
their deeds. There is an analogous type of case, however, in which color of title is a factor. This type
of case involves a lappage, whereby two adjoining landowners hold deeds that describe boundaries
that "lap upon each other." Id. at 392-93, 167 S.E.2d at 771. In such a case one of the deeds is
necessarily mistaken because there can only be one true boundary. For a full discussion of color of
title and lappage, see Kalo, The Doctrineof Color of Title in North Carolina, 13 N.C. CErT. L.J. 123
(1982).
21. P. HETRICK, supra note 1, § 293, at 320.
22. Prior to the decision in Walls, this required element of intent, and its consequences, had
been described as follows:
Contrary to the weight of American authority, a conscious intention to claim title to
the land of the true owner is required to make out adverse possession in North Carolina if
there is no color of title. In this state, if the possession is by mistake due to a mistaken
boundary, or if the possession is equivocal in character, and without color of title, it is not
adverse. The existence of mistake negates the requisite intent to establish adverse
possession.
Walls, 315 N.C. at 244, 337 S.E.2d at 559 (quoting P. HETRICK, supra note 1, § 293, at 320). The
requirement of a conscious intent to possess against the true owner has not been applied in cases
involving color of title. P. HETRICK, supra note 1, § 293, at 320 n.62. Indeed, most claims of
adverse possession under color of title involve possessors who mistakenly believed that their deed or
other instrument of conveyance actually conveyed good title to the land in question and thus, necessarily lacked any intent to claim against the true owner. See id.; Kalo, supra note 20, at 139-40.
23. See, eg., Price v. Whisnant, 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851 (1952); Gibson v. Dudley, 233
N.C. 255, 63 S.E.2d 630 (1951); Sipe v. Blankenship, 37 N.C. App. 499, 246 S.E.2d 527 (1978), cert.
denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 470 (1979); Garris v. Butler, 15 N.C. App. 268, 189 S.E.2d 809
(1972). Walls expressly overruled these cases "to the extent that they apply a different rule." Walls,
315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562.
24. For general background on this issue, see the sources listed in note 5, supra.
25. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1171, § 2, at 1174 (1961).
26. See Note, supra note 5, at 633-34 (discussing the three rules and the status of the law in
North Carolina in 1955).
27. Helmholz, supra note 5, at 339; Kalo, supra note 20, at 135; Note, supra note 5, at 633.
28. 8 Conn. 439 (1831).
29. Id. at 443; see Note, supra note 5, at 633. This rule is sometimes called the "Connecticut
rule." See Helmholz, supra note 5, at 339.
30. G. THompsoN, supranote 5, § 2548, at 630 & n.14; Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1171, § 2, at 1174
(1961).
31. French, 8 Conn. at 443.
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assertion of his own title, and the denial of the title of all others." 32 Possession

based on an honest mistake, if continued for the requisite period, is as effective to
based on a wrongful motivation to take the land from
acquire title as possession
33
the true owner.

The minority rule,34 as stated in Preble v. Maine Central Railroad Co.,3"
uses a subjective test 36 and has two aspects. If a mistaken landowner holds possession up to a certain line beyond the true boundary with intent to claim title up

37
to that line in the event a mistake is discovered, the possession is adverse.
However, if the mistaken landowner holds possession up to that line, but intends
to claim title only to the true boundary, the possession is not adverse.38 "It is
not merely the existence of a mistake, but the presence or absence of the requisite intention to claim title, that fixes the character of the entry and determines
''39
the question of disseisin.
40
A third rule, as set forth in the North Carolina cases of Gibson v. Dudley
41
and Price v. Whisnant, provides that possession beyond a true boundary cannot be adverse if it is based on a mistaken belief that the disputed area is encompassed by the description in the possessor's deed. 42 A possessor must have a
conscious intention to claim against the true owner to establish adverse possession. 43 The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this rule in Walls and over-

32. Id. at 445.
33. Id. at 443.
34. See Note, supra note 5, at 634.
35. 85 Me. 260, 27 A. 149 (1893). This rule is sometimes called the "Maine view." Helimholz,
supra note 5, at 339.
36. G. THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 2548, at 630; Helmholz, supra note 5, at 339; Annot. 80
A.L.R.2d 1161, § 2, at 1174 (1961).
37. Preble, 85 Me. at 265, 27 A. at 150.
It must be an intention to claim title to all land within a certain boundary on the face of the
earth, whether it shall eventually be found to be the correct one or not. If, for instance, one
in ignorance of his actual boundaries takes and holds possession by mistake up to a certain
fence beyond his limits, upon the claim and in the belief that it is the true line, with the
intention to claim title, and thus, if necessary, to acquire "title by possession" up to that
fence, such possession, having the requisite duration and continuity, will ripen into title.

Id.
38. Id. at 265-66, 27 A. at 150.
If, on the other hand, a party through ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake occupies up
to a given fence beyond his actual boundary, because he believes it to be the true line, but
has no intention to claim title to that extent if it should be ascertained that the fence was on
his neighbor's land, an indispensable element of adverse possession is wanting. In such a
case the intent to claim title only exists upon the condition that the fence is on the true line.
The intention is not absolute, but provisional, and the possession is not adverse.
Id.
39. Id. at 266, 27 A. at 150.
40. 233 N.C. 255, 63 S.E.2d 630 (1951), overruled by Walls v. Grohman, 315 N.C. 239, 337
S.E.2d 556 (1985).
41. 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851 (1952), overruled by Walls v. Grohman, 315 N.C. 239, 337
S.E.2d 556 (1985).
42. See Price, 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851 (1952); Gibson, 233 N.C. 255, 63 S.E.2d 630 (1951);
Note, supra note 5, at 633-34. "[N]o act of the [possessor], however exclusive, open and notorious it
may have been prior to the time he discovered the area now in dispute was not covered by the
description in his deed, will be considered adverse." Price, 236 N.C. at 385, 72 S.E.2d at 854.
43. Garris v. Butler, 15 N.C. App. 268, 270-71, 189 S.E.2d 809, 810-11 (1972), overruled by
Walls v. Grohman, 315 N.C. 239, 337 S.E.2d 556 (1985).
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ruled prior cases that had applied it.44 Few, if any, jurisdictions follow this rule
45
today.
The Walls court enunciated the rule to be applied in North Carolina:
[W]e now join the overwhelming majority of states, return to the law
as it existed prior to Price and Gibson, and hold that when a landowner, acting under a mistake as to the true boundary between his
property and that of another, takespossession of the land believing it to
be his own
and claims title thereto, his possession and claim of title is
46
adverse.
The literal language of this holding seems to indicate that the court intended to
adopt the French rule. 47 However, the court's statement that "we now join the
overwhelming majority of states" 48 raises a problem with this interpretation.
Earlier in the opinion the court quoted a restatement of the Preble holding as
"[t]he general rule throughout the United States regarding possession under mistake or ignorance."'49 Taken together these statements support an interpretation
Where ... a grantee goes into possession of the tract of land conveyed to him and also a
contiguous tract not included in the conveyance under the mistaken belief that the contiguous tract was included within the description in his deed, no act of such grantee, however
exclusive, open and notorious will constitute adverse possession of the contiguous tract so
long as he thinks his deed covers the contiguous tract, since there is no intent on hispartto
claim adverse to the true owner.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Price v. Whisnant, 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851 (1952)).
44. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562. For a list of these cases, see supra note 15.
45. Note, supra note 5, at 634-35; Annot., 97 A.L.R. 14, 18 (1935) ("In a few early cases it was
distinctly held that a mistake would not give title by adverse possession, or that there could be no
disseisin by mistake ....
But this idea is now abandoned .... "). But see Ellis v. Jansing, 620
S.W.2d 569, 571-72 (Tex. 1981) (apparently requiring a conscious intention to claim against the true
owner in order for possession to be adverse); Note, Ellis v. Jansing: Intent and the Mistaken or
Inadvertent Possession, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 733, 743-47 (1982) (containing an analysis of Texas
adverse possession cases and the possible impact of Ellis v. Jansing on future cases).
46. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562. The court stated further, "If such adverse
possession meets all other requirements and continues for the requisite statutory period, the claimant
acquires title by adverse possession even though the claim of title is founded on a mistake." Id.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
48. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562.
49. Id. at 245-46, 337 S.E.2d at 560. The court quoted the following passages:
It is a widely accepted rule that where one, in ignorance of his actual boundaries, takes
and holds possession by mistake up to a certain line beyond his limits, upon the claim and
in the belief that it is the true line, with the intention to claim title, and thus, if necessary,
to acquire "title by possession" up to that line, such possession, having the requisite duration and continuity, will ripen into title.... But if, on the other hand, a party, through
ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake, occupies up to a given line beyond his actual boundary, because he believes it to be the true line, but has no intention to claim title to that
extent if it should be ascertained that such line is on his neighbor's land, an indispensable
element of adverse possession is wanting ....
Where an occupant of land is in doubt as to the location of the true line it is reasonable to inquire as to his state of mind in occupying the land in dispute, and if, having such
doubt, he intends to hold the disputed area only if that area is included in the land described in his deed, then it is reasonable to say that the requisite hostility is lacking; but if
the occupation of the disputed area is under a mistaken belief that it is included in the
description of his deed-a state of mind sometimes described as pure mistake to distinguish
it from the cases of conscious doubt-then his possession is adverse.
Id. at 245-46, 377 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 41, at 128-30 (1962)
(footnote omitted)). These two paragraphs, when read together, are somewhat confusing. The first
paragraph is nearly a word for word quote from the Preble case. See supra notes 37-38. The second
paragraph introduces a somewhat different concept, the existence of conscious doubt regarding the
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that the court believed the Preble rule to be the general rule and intended to
adopt it as the law of North Carolina. Because there remains a split of authority
among the states, however, between the French rule and the Preble rule,5 0 arguably, there is no general rule.5 1
Another factor to be considered is the statement by the Walls court that it
intended to "return to the law [of North Carolina] as it existed prior to Price and
Gibson."'52 According to the court the prior law of the state had been enunciated in the 1922 case of Dawson v. Abbott.5 3 Specifically, the court in Walls
quoted the following language from Dawson as being the law of North Carolina
at that time: "There must be an intention to claim title to all land within a
certain boundary, whether it eventually be the correct one or not."' 54 This intention is one aspect of the Preble rule. 55 The Dawson court also stated the other
aspect of the Preble rule: when a possessor occupies beyond the true boundary,
but with an intent to claim only to the true boundary, such possession is not
56
adverse.

After setting forth the Preble rule, however, the Dawson court stated that
there was no mistake involved in the case because the possessor "claimed up to
the line which he asserted, all the time, to be the true one."'57 Furthermore, the
Dawson court stated:

Even if there had been a mistake originally as to the location of the
true line, yet if the plaintiff asserted it to be at a certain place, and
location of the true boundary. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text. The confusion arises because the second paragraph concludes by stating the French rule-"if
the occupation of the disputed area is under a mistaken belief that it is included in his deed ... then
his possession is adverse," id.-without mentioning the previously quoted statement of the Preble
rule requiring an "intention to claim title." The Walls opinion follows a similar analysis, first setting
forth the Preble rule, but then applying the objective test of the French rule. See infra text accompanying notes 52-62.
50. See supra notes 27-39, and accompanying text.
51. However, because the French rule is followed by the majority ofjurisdictions, Kalo, supra
note 20, at 135, it could be considered the general rule.
52. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562. See supra text accompanying note 46.
53. Walls, 315 N.C. at 244-45, 337 S.E.2d at 559 (citing Dawson v. Abbott, 184 N.C. 192, 114
S.E. 15 (1922)).
54. Walls, 315 N.C. at 245, 337 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Dawson, 184 N.C. at 196, 114 S.E. at
16).
It is not merely the existence of a mistake, but the presence or absence of the requisite
intention to claim title, that fixes the character of the entry and determines the question of
disseisin. There must be an intention to claim title to all land within a certain boundary,
whether it eventually be the correct one or not. Where a person, acting under a mistake as
to the true boundary line between his land and that of another, takes possession of land of
another, believing it to be his own, up to a mistaken line, claiming title to it and so holding,
the holding is adverse, and, if continued for the requisite period, will give title by adverse
possession.
Dawson, 184 N.C. at 196, 114 S.E. at 16.
55. See supra note 37.
56. Dawson, 184 N.C. at 195, 114 S.E. at 16.
[Where the occupation of the land is by mere mistake, and with no intention on the part of
the occupant to claim as his own land which does not belong to him, but he intends to
claim only to the true line, wherever it may be, the holding is not adverse.
Id.
57. Id. at 196, 114 S.E. at 17.
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occupied and claimed up to it in his own right, although he may have
been mistaken as to where the true line was, his possession would still
be adverse. 58
Thus, while stating the elements of intent required under Preble, the court in
Dawson emphasized that the possessor claimed and occupied the land in ques59
tion as his own. This is the focus of the French rule.
The court in Walls followed a similar analysis. Although the court described the elements of the Preble rule, it focused on the facts defendants
thought their deed included the land in question 60 and claimed and used it as
their own.6 1 These facts do not support a conclusion that defendants' possession
was adverse under the Preble rule. Under that rule the possessor must intend to
claim the land in question in the event it is discovered that the possession extended beyond the true boundary. 62 There is no indication in Walls of any expression by defendants that prior to the controversy they had considered what
they would do if it were discovered that they were mistaken as to the location of
the true boundary.
Indeed, one problem with the Preble rule is that it necessitates an inquiry
into the possessor's intent under circumstances that probably were never considered before the mistake was discovered. 63 In the absence of a subjective intent to
claim beyond the true boundary in the event a mistake is discovered, possession
beyond the true boundary is not adverse. 64 Thus, most mistaken possessors cannot acquire title under the Preble rule unless they fabricate the requisite intent or
the court presumes it to have existed. Moreover, honest mistaken possessors
will automatically lose under the Preble rule if they testify at trial that they
occupied and claimed the land in question as their own, but they never intended
65
to take anything that was not included in their deed.
The Walls court recognized the problem with requiring a prior conscious
intent to claim beyond the true boundary when it stated that the existing North
Carolina rule of Price and Gibson 66 had "been criticized as rewarding only
the claimant who is a thief." 67 This criticism applies equally to the Preble
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
60. Walls, 315 N.C. at 240, 243, 337 S.E.2d at 557-58.
61. Id. at 242-43, 337 S.E.2d at 558.
62. See supra text accompanying note 37.
63. See Note, supra note 5, at 636.
64. See Note, supra note 5, at 634-35.
65. See Note, supra note 5, at 636.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
67. Walls, 315 N.C. at 248, 337 S.E.2d at 561. In a footnote to this statement, the court cited
the following criticism:
This view "not only confers a premium upon conscious wrongdoing, but introduces
into the law of adverse possession a requirement never otherwise asserted. Under such a
rule there could be no adverse possession unless the possessor had the intention of claiming
the land if his title is defective. Ordinarily a person who believes that he owns certain land,
or land up to a certain boundary, has no thought as to what he will do if he is mistaken.
Even assuming that he has an intention, such intention is necessarily difficult, and frequently impossible, of determination. If his own testimony concerning his motive is accepted a premium is placed on perjury."
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rule.68 Under the rule of Price and Gibson the possessor must have an unqualified intent to claim against the true owner.69 Under the Preble rule there must

be an intent to claim against the true owner in the event the mistake is discovered. 70 If the Preble rule is7 1strictly applied there is little difference in the practical effect of the two rules.
The question arises whether there was any reason preventing the W/alls
court from expressly adopting the French rule. One possibility is that the French
rule, by not requiring a subjective intent to claim against a perceived or potential
true owner, 72 is inconsistent with the presumption sometimes stated by North

Carolina courts that possession by someone other than the true owner is
73

permissive.
The North Carolina courts have employed two different types of presump-

tions in adverse possession cases. The first type is an evidentiary presumption,
created by statute, that the holder of legal title has been in possession within the
limitation period; 74 possession by someone other than the record owner is
deemed to have been permissive. 75 Proof of adverse possession, however, rebuts
this presumption 76 regardless of which rule is used to determine when posses-

sion is adverse. Thus, the French rule is not inconsistent with the statutory
presumption.
The other type of presumption is a conclusive presumption 77 created by the

courts. Under such a presumption, unless the possessor had a conscious intent
Id. at 248 n.1, 337 S.E.2d at 561-62 n.I (quoting H. TIFFANY, TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY § 551,
at 482-83 (abr. 3d ed. 1970)).
68. In fact, Professor Tiffany directed the criticism quoted in note 67, supra, at the Preble rule,
as evidenced by a specific reference to Preblein the previous edition of the treatise. See H. TIFFANY,
TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY § 751, at 791 n.92 (new abr. ed. 1940).
69. See supra note 40-43 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
71. The only time there might be a different result under the Preble rule is if there had been a
previous controversy regarding the location of the true boundary. In such a case the adverse possessor may have had an intent to claim title to the disputed area in the event he or she was mistaken
regarding the location of the true boundary, but because of.the mistake, did not have a conscious
intent throughout possession to claim against the true owner.
72. See supra text accompanying note 31.
73. P. HETRICK, supra note 1, § 289, at 313; Kalo, supra note 20, at 135.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42 (1983).
In every action for the recovery or possession of real property, or damages for a trespass on such possession, the person establishing a legal title to the premises is presumed to
have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of such
premises by any other person is deemed to have been under, and in subordination to, the
legal title, unless it appears that the premises have been held and possessed adversely to the
legal title for the time prescribed by law ....
Id. See, eg., Williams v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 266 N.C. 761, 147 S.E.2d 381 (1966); Barbee v.
Edwards, 238 N.C. 215, 77 S.E.2d 646 (1953); Conkey v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 126 N.C. 499,
36 S.E. 42 (1900); Campbell v. Mayberry, 12 N.C. App. 469, 183 S.E.2d 867, cert. denied, 279 N.C.
726, 184 S.E.2d 883 (1971).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42 (1983).
76. See id. For a discussion of the law relevant to rebuttable presumptions, see 2 H. BRANDIS,
BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 215, at 170-74 & n.87 (2d rev. ed. 1982).
77. A conclusive presumption is not an evidentiary device but rather a substantive rule of law.
2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 76, § 215, at 170-71.
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to claim against the true owner, the possession cannot have been adverse.78 This
principle was the foundation of the rule of Price and Gibson in mistaken boundary cases. 79 Because the Walls court rejected the rule of Price and Gibson,80 it
follows that the presumption was rejected also. Thus, there was no remaining

presumption to preclude adoption of the French rule.
The Walls court, however, may have refused to adopt the French rule expressly because it was disinclined to reject the requirements of the Preble rule
regarding the subjective intent of the possessor. 81 The court may have believed
that these requirements were necessary to resolve two situations that arguably
necessitate special consideration. The general framework of the French rule,
however, can provide for both of these situations.

In the first situation the possessor has both a conscious doubt regarding the

82
location of the true boundary and an intent to claim only to the true boundary.

Arguably there should be no distinction between this situation and the typical
mistaken boundary case in which the possessor honestly believes a certain line to

be the true boundary and actually intends to occupy and claim up to that

line.

83

Nevertheless, possession in such a case can be held not to be adverse under the

French rule because the possessor would not have the requisite intent to possess
and claim "as his own" any portion of the property that extended beyond the

true boundary. 84 Although it confuses the analysis somewhat, it can be argued
that because of the existence of a conscious doubt there is no mistake involved in

such a case.85 A more logical analysis simply uses an objective test of whether

78. Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N.C. 255, 258, 63 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1951) ("'[E]very possession of
land is presumed to be under the true title.... And if the possession is by mistake or is equivocal in
character, and not with the intent to claim against the true owner, it is not adverse.' ") (quoting
Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 175 N.C. 11, 13-14, 94 S.E. 703, 704-05 (1917)), overruled by Walls v.
Grohman, 315 N.C. 239, 337 S.E.2d 556 (1985).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
80. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
82. This situation is distinguished from a typical mistaken boundary case, such as Walls, in
which the possessor honestly and firmly believes a certain line to be the true boundary and actually
intends to occupy up to that line. See Walls, 315 N.C. at 240-42, 337 S.E.2d at 557-58.
83. If the essential elements of adverse possession are present, see supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text, the interest of the true owner is still impaired, regardless of any subjective doubt or
intent on the part of the possessor.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. The problem with this analysis, however, is that
the objectivity of the French rule is diminished by the necessity to weigh evidence regarding the
subjective doubt of the possessor.
85. In fact, the court in Walls alluded to such a distinction when it stated:
Where an occupant of land is in doubt as to the location of the true line it is reasonable to inquire as to his state of mind in occupying the land in dispute, and if, having such
doubt, he intends to hold the disputed area only if that area is included in his deed, then it
is reasonable to say that the requisite hostility is lacking; but if the occupation of the disputed area is under a mistaken belief that it is included in the description in his deed-a
state of mind sometimes described as pure mistake to distinguish it from the cases of conscious doubt-then his possession is adverse.
Walls, 315 N.C. at 246, 337 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting 3 AM. JUR. 2D § 41, at 130 (1962)); see Norgard
v. Busher, 220 Or. 297, 301, 349 P.2d 490, 492-93 (1960). The quoted passage obviously draws from
the French rule, but it confuses the French analysis by requiring a determination of whether an
element of subjective doubt is present.
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86
the essential elements of adverse possession are present.

The second situation is one involving a slight encroachment by mistake beyond the true boundary, such as a mistake in the placement of a fence. In North

Carolina, however, a "slight encroachment" is not adverse.8 7 This result can be
reached under two distinct theories. Some cases have held that possession in a
case of slight encroachment is not adverse because there is no intent to claim
against the true owner.88 The better view focuses on the requirement that possession be open and notorious to be adverse.8 9 Under this view, which is consistent with the objective test of the French rule, 90 the facts of each case will
determine whether the encroachment was sufficient to put the true owner on
notice of its existence. 9 1
Thus, there were no apparent reasons to preclude the Walls court from

adopting the French rule. Furthermore, the facts of Walls do not support a
finding under the Preble rule that the possession was adverse. Thus, it seems
apparent that the court in Walls actually intended to adopt the French rule as

the law of North Carolina. Under the express holding of the court that a landowner who occupies beyond the true boundary by mistake must "[take] possession of the land believing it to be his own and claim title thereto" 92 for the

possession to be adverse, this conclusion is both reasonable and defensible.
To acquire title under the French rule claimants must prove only that they

have been in actual possession and that the possession has been hostile and exclusive, open and notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted for the requisite
statutory period. 93 This objective test is more logical, easier to apply, and more
94

likely to yield consistent results than the subjective test of the Preble rule.
There is no need under the French rule to inquire whether claimants had an

intent to claim the disputed area in the event a mistake was discovered, a possi86. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text for a description of these elements.
87. Kalo, supra note 20, at 138-39; Note, supranote 5, at 635-36. The courts have not precisely
defined the term "slight encroachment," but rather have simply used it when it seemed to apply to
the facts of a particular situation. Indeed, because of the factual nature of the determination in each
case, the term is not particularly useful. The better method of analysis focuses on whether the
particular encroachment was sufficiently open and notorious to put the true owner on notice of its
existence. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
88. See Kalo, supra note 20, at 138-39; see, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 175 N.C. 11, 94 S.E.
703 (1917); Waldo v. Wilson, 173 N.C. 689, 92 S.E. 692 (1917); Blue Ridge Land Co. v. Floyd, 171
N.C. 543, 88 S.E. 862 (1916); Currie v. Gilchrist, 147 N.C. 648, 61 S.E. 581 (1908); King v. Wells,
94 N.C. 344 (1886). This lack of intent to claim against the true owner was the theory of Priceand
Gibson. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. That theory was rejected in Walls. See
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
89. See Kalo, supranote 20, at 139. For a definition of open and notorious, see supra note 18.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
91. See McLean v. Smith, 106 N.C. 172, 179, 11 S.E. 184, 186 (1890) ("The quantity of land
taken into the enclosure is not so insignificant that a vigilant man would have overlooked the trespass ....");Green v. Harnan, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 158, 164 (1833) ("[W]hen the portion into which
the actual entry is made, and possession taken, is very minute,... an owner of reasonable diligence
and ordinary vigilance, might remain ignorant that it included his land ....). Both of these cases
were lappage cases,
92. Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32. These essential elements of adverse possession
are discussed supra at notes 16-20.
94. See Note, supra note 5, at 637.
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bility that most landowners never consider. Nor will claims be defeated simply
because honest landowners admit that they never intended to take more than
was included in their deed. Moreover, the French rule best serves the policy
considerations behind the doctrine of adverse possession 95 by encouraging landowners to make productive use of their land and by protecting honest mistaken
possessors who have remained in possession for the period prescribed by
96
statute.
By expressly rejecting the rule of Price and Gibson, a rule that has been
"criticized as rewarding only the claimant who is a thief,"'97 the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Walls also impliedly rejected the Preble rule because both
rules require a subjective intent to claim against the true owner for possession to
be adverse. The courts have not required such an intent in cases of adverse
possession under color of title. 98 Walls therefore eliminated a significant inconsistency between the rules governing the two types of cases, 99 and substantially
improved the law of adverse possession in North Carolina. The North Carolina
courts should henceforth apply the objective test of the French rule in all adverse
possession cases.
JOHN AYCOCK MCLENDON, JR.

95. See supra note 1.
96. Note, supra note 5, at 636-37.
97. Walls, 315 N.C. at 248, 337 S.E.2d at 561.
98. P. HETRICK, supra note 1, § 293, at 320 & n.62. See supra note 22.
99. One difference that remains between the elements necessary to establish adverse possession
in cases involving color of title and those not involving color of title is the difference in the limitation
periods prescribed by statute. See supra note 20.

